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ARTICLES

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS
UNDER THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
KATHRYN R. URBONY A*
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INTRODUCTION

Police officers routinely use their vehicles to pursue individuals
who flee when signalled to stop. 1 Many of these pursuits conclude only
when drivers, passengers, and pedestrians are injured or killed. 2 Indi1. The traditional definition of a police pursuit is "an active attempt by a law
enforcement officer operating a vehicle with emergency equipment to apprehend a suspected law violator in a motor vehicle, when the driver of the vehicle attempts to avoid
apprehension." R. DUNHAM & G. ALPERT, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 217 (1989). Under this definition, an officer's initial signalling of a
driver to pull over to the side of the road does not become a pursuit until the driver
exhibits flight behavior and the officer follows. Most law enforcement agencies similarly
define police pursuits. One agency has exempted from its pursuit definition the act of
following if it is of a "short duration." See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S.
257 joint app. at 90 (1987) (Rule 23, § 8(a) provides: "The guidelines regarding the
continuous high speed pursuit are not meant to deter the high speed chase situation of
short duration which is so often necessary in traffic violation enforcement or cases involving misdemeanors"). For purposes of this article, the traditional definition applies
because pursuits of short duration are as harmful as longer pursuits and the need to
pursue all traffic offenders is questionable. See e.g., Alpert & Dunham, Policing Hot
Pursuits: The Discovery of Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521,
531 (1989) ("no clear relationship between time elapsed and injury"); see infra notes
262-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unlawfulness of pursuits for nonserious· traffic offenses.
2. Barker, Police Pursuit Driving: The Need for Policy, 51 PoLICE CHIEF 70
(1984) (pursuits "may result in more deaths and injuries than any other law enforcement activity, including the use of firearms").
One recent scientific study examined police pursuits in a Florida county. Alpert &
Dunham, supra note 1, at 527-38. It determined that 34% of all pursuits ended in
accidents. /d. at 528. Twenty-three percent resulted in bodily injury and 1% resulted
in death. /d. Of those injured, 63% were either the driver or the passenger, 31% were
officers, and 6% were bystanders. /d.
Police officers initiated the "majority of the pursuits ... for relatively minor traffic
infractions." /d. at 535.

1991]

HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS

207

viduals harmed as result of a pursuit have generally sought relief under
state law. 8 This relief, however, has often been difficult to obtain because state law often provides officers with immunity for their discretionary actions.• Recent statistical studies of pursuits 11 and decisions by
the United States Supreme Court,6 however, provide support for the
position that when police officers use their vehicles to pursue individuals, they generally use force that is disproportionate to the need for it.
Such excessive force may violate an individual's constitutional right to
personal security, 7 a right protected by the fourth amendment's prohiAnother study examined pursuits that occurred in Minnesota in 1989. 1989 Minnesota State Report 124-127. Forty-four percent terminated with an accident. Id. at
125. Twenty-four percent resulted in bodily injury and less than 1% resulted in fatalities. /d. Of those injured, 54% were the driver, 23% were the driver's passengers, 18%
were police officers, and 5% were other motorists. /d. Seventy-six percent of the pursuits were initiated for traffic offenses. /d. at 124.
Although examining statistics related to pursuits is helpful in determining whet~er
the practice of pursuing is too inherently dangerous to justify the risks associated with
pursuits, one should also recognize that an outcome of a pursuit is not necessarily the
best measure of whether the force actually used was disproportionate to the need for it.
See Alpert, Questioning Police Pursuits in Urban Areas, 15 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN.
298, 301 (1987) ("The obvious measure, an outcome of a pursuit, may not be a responsible criterion of good or bad police behavior, as many bad pursuits end without an
accident, and many good pursuits end in an accident."). One should also consider what
offenses justify police officers engaging in pursuits and under what environmental circumstances pursuits should be restricted. See infra notes 262-84 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these issues.
3. See G. ALPERT & L. FRIDELL, POLICE OFFICERS USE OF DEADLY FORCE:
GuNs, VEHICLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS (1991) ("Until the Supreme Court acknowledges the severe danger of pursuits ... , the law of pursuits will be that of negligence."). See generally Zevitz, Police Civil Liability and the Law of High Speed Pursuit, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 237, 245 (1987) (the typical state statute provides that police
officers exercise "due regard" during pursuits).
4. See, e.g., G. ALPERT & L. FRIDELL, supra note 3 ("many states provided limited sovereign immunity to discretionary rather than ministerial decisions"); Zevitz,
Police Civil Liability and the Law of High Speed Pursuit, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 237, 254
(1987) (some states may allow officers immunity if they in "good faith [relied] ... on
existing departmental pursuit policies"). See generally CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17004.7
(West 1990) (immunity for public agency if it adopts a pursuit policy that complies
with statutory requirements); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(b)(l)(a) (Anderson
1989) (political subdivision has defense to liability unless pursuing officers acted willfully or wantonly); id. at § 2744.03(A)(6) (officer is immune unless act was "manifestly outside the scope of his employment" or he acted "in bad faith, or in a wanton or
recklesss manner").
5. Alpert & Dunham, supra note l, at 528, 535 (pursuits caused personal injuries in more than one-fifth of all pursuits and the reason compelling the pursuit was
traffic offense); 1989 Minnesota Report 1, 125-26 (same).
6. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's disproportionality standard for excessive force claims.
7. Although the United States Supreme Court has never detailed the exact scope
of the right to personal security, the fourteenth amendment prohibits governmental
officials from imposing "bodily restraint and punishment" unless the government af-

a
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bition of unreasonable seizures. 8 Excessive force may also violate the
substantive due process component of the fourteenth amendment, 9

fords due process. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (students have an
interest in personal security); see also Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036
(1990) (mentally ill prisoner has "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs" under the fourteenth amendment); Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (institutionalized persons have a liberty interest in
personal security). See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (right to
personal security constitutes a fundamental right). The fourth amendment also protects
an individual's interest in bodily integrity and autonomy. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (individual has a "fundamental interest in his own life");
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985) (fourth amendment prohibits unneces·
sary surgery to remove bullet for evidence during trial); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1968) ("inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study"). In describing the scope
of the right to personal security, some courts have recognized that psychological injuries as well as physical injuries are actionable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(Rubin, J., concurring) (fourth and fourteenth amendment protection "is not limited to
physical injuries but extends to all damage inflicted"); Wright v. District of Columbia,
No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 28, 1990) (order granting partial summary judgment)
(driver pursued by officers in unmarked vehicle stated a fourth amendment claim for
psychological injury caused by being in fear for her life). This Article focuses on physical injuries arising from PQlice pursuits, injuries actionable under the fourth or fourteenth amendments.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in part that "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures,
shall not be violated." Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment prohibits state officials from depriving a person of "life [or] liberty ... without due process of law." /d.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution similarly restricts federal officials. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Some courts have struggled to understand the substantive
due process component of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.• Duckworth v. Franzen,
780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) (substantive due
process is an oxymoron). The Supreme Court has stated that conduct that "shocks the
conscience" violates the substantive due process component of the fourteenth amendment. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). One court has stated that applying the "shocks the conscience" standard is only possible in the context of an excessive
force claim. Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1990) (uniform
decisions are possible for fourteenth amendment substantive due process claims that
implicate physical abuse).
Recently the Supreme Court clarified that the substantive due process component
of the fourteenth amendment is one of three types of "due process" claims possible
under the fourteenth amendment. See Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 983 (1990).
The Court described the substantive due process component as barring "certain arbi·
trary, wrongful governmental actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used
to implement them.'" /d. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
The fourteenth amendment also provides protection under section 1983 for violations of
other substantive rights found in the Bill of Rights, such as the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Id. at 982-83; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). In contrast to these substantive rights, the fourteenth amendment also guarantees the right to procedural due process, the right to a "fair procedure." 110 S. Ct. at
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which prohibits egregious conduct. Determining the constitutionality of
police pursuits thus requires consideration of two issues: 1) the standard of disproportionality under the fourth 10 and fourteenth 11 amendments and 2) the definition of a "seizure," 12 because the fourth amendment applies only to individuals "seized" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. 18
Courts have interpreted both the fourteenth 14 and the fourth 111

'983.
This Article describes the right of personal security as an interest protected by the
fourth amendment and the substantive due process component of the fourteenth
amendment. These are the terms the Supreme Court recently used in discussing excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees and by individuals seized by police officers. Connor v. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). The eighth amendment, however, protects a prisoner's right to personal security. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475
u.s. 312, 318-27 (1986).
10. See infra notes 214-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of disproportionality under the fourth amendment.
11. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of disproportionality under the fourteenth amendment.
12. See infra notes 353-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of what conduct constitutes a fourth amendment "seizure."
13. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) ("all claims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force- deadly or not- in the course of
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed
under the [f]ourth [a]mendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under
'substantive due process' approach") (emphasis in original)).
14. The first test of disproportionality was articulated in Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
Since this decision, courts have considered, but interpreted differently, the four
factors in determining whether force was disproportionate to the need for it. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the first two factors as requiring "grossly
disproportionate" force. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1990)
(citing Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981)). The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has recently criticized the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the factors
and has focused the inquiry on whether the force used was reasonable. Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990). Some courts have required the plaintiff to
have incurred a "severe injury." See, e.g., Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655-56 (lOth
Cir. 1987). Other courts have required more than a "minimal" injury. See, e.g.. Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (lith Cir. 1990); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913,
924 (2d Cir. 1987) ("permanent or severe" injury not necessary). Similar disagreement
has occurred regarding the fourth factor, the need for malicious conduct. Compare
Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d at 265 (malice necessary) with Landol-Rivera v. Cruz
Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990) ("'reckless or callous indifference to an
individual's right'" sufficient) (quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d
553, 559 (1st Cir. 1989)). The Supreme Court, however, has expressly left open
whether conduct that is grossly negligent or reckless is actionable under the fourteenth
amendment. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986). See generally
Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to Personal Security
under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation of the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REv. 171, 174-99 (1987)
(collecting fourteenth amendment excessive force cases).
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amendment as prohibiting disproportionate force. In 1973, Judge
Friendly of the Second Circuit first detailed in Johnson v. Glick 16 the
following four factors for determining when force is disproportionate
under the fourteenth amendment: 1) the need for the force, 2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, 3) the extent
of the injury, and 4) the officer's motives. 17 Since this decision, all
courts have applied the first two factors, 18 which directly, relate to the
question of proportionality, and only a few courts have considered the
last two factors/ 9 which· do not directly relate to the issue of
proportionality.
The fourth amendment standard. of proportionality similarly entails consideration of the first two Glick factors. 20 In 1985, the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner21 implicitly applied these Glick
factors to a fourth amendment excessive force claim. 22 In Garner, the
Court held that police officers used disproportionate force when they
killed a burglary suspect who was attempting to ftee. 28 In balancing the
interests of the parties, the Court noted that the state's need to apprehend the individual did not outweigh the suspect's interest in his life
because the suspect did not present a risk to others if left at large, even
though he had allegedly committed a felony. 2 " Recently, the Supreme
Court in Graham v. Connorr. applied the Garner proportionality test to

15. In 1985, the fourth amendment became a basis for evaluating the excessiveness of force used during an arrest after the Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985), declared that the use of deadly force to stop all fleeing felons
was objectively unreasonable and that this force violated the fourth amendment. See,
e.g.• Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) (examining excessive force claim under both fourth
and fourteenth amendment); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir.
1987) (examining excessive force claim soley under fourth amendment standard of objective reasonableness). Recently, the Supreme Court declared that only the fourth
amendment's standard of reasonableness applies to claims that officers used excessive
force arising from a stop, an arrest, or "other seizure" of an individual. Graham v.
Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). For a discussion of how the fourth amendment
standard of reasonableness questions the disproportionality of force, see infra notes
214-93 and accompanying text.
16. 481 E2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
17. /d. at 1033.
18. See supra note 14 and infra notes 319-22 for a discussion of the federal
circuit courts' interpretation of the Glick factors.
19. 481 F.2d at 1033.
20. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion the fourth
amendment standard of disproportionality.
21. 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
22. See infra notes 224-47 and accompanying text for a discussion the Garner
standard of disproportionality.
23. 471 U.S. at 11-12.
24. /d.
'
25. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
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the use of nondeadly force. 28 The Court determined that the force applied should be proportionate to the danger posed by the suspect, with
the danger being measured by the seriousness of the alleged offense and
the risk of harm in failing to capture the suspect. 27 In addition, the
Court clarified that the fourth Glick factor -the officials' motiveswas not necessary to establish a fourth amendment excessive force
claim. 28
When police officers pursue individuals without relating the risk of
harm inherent in the pursuit to the offense or offenses initiating the
pursuit, they may breach the duty they owe under the fourth 29 and
fourteenth 80 amendments not to use force that unduly infringes upon
an individual's interest in personal security. The scope of protection
available under these amendments, however, depends upon the relation-·
ship between the police officers and the injured individual. The fourth
amendment specifically applies to the relationship between the police
officers and individuals "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 81 In contrast, the fourteenth amendment applies to the relationship between police officers and individuals not "seized" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 82 Determining which amendment applies thus depends upon whether police officers "seized" an individual. The Court's recent decision in Brower v. County of lnyo, 88
however, makes this task difficult because it set forth a new definition
of a fourth amendment "seizure. " 84
In Brower, the Court stated that a seizure occurs "only when there
is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied." 86 Brower not only leaves unclear whether this
definition replaces the Court's prior two "seizure" definitions, 88 but it

26. Id. at 1871-72.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1872-73.
29. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty
police officers owe under the fourth amendment.
30. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty
police officers owe under the fourteenth amendment.
31. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989); see also infra notes
355-457 and accompanying text for a discussion of when individuals are "seized"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
32. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.10.
33. 489 u.s. 593 (1989).
34. See infra notes 404-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confusion created by the Court's new "seizure" definition.
35. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99.
36. See infra n.otes 368-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"seizure" definition the Court articulated in Terry v. Ohio,'392 U.S. 1, 20 n.l6 (1968)
and infra notes 383-400 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "seizure" definition the Court articulated in INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
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also creates two distinct causation issues for pursuits: 37 whether a pursuit caused an individual to stop38 and whether the pursuit caused an
individual's injuries. 39 Applying the new "seizure" definition in the context of a pursuit claim thus requires an understanding of how police
officers may use their cruisers as both physical force 40 and psychological force 41 to apprehend and injure an individual.
Whether a pursuit violates the fourth or fourteenth amendment
depends upon how one views the force officials use during a pursuit that is, whether it was disproportionate and whether it effected a fourth
amendment "seizure." Resolving these issues, however, also entails
choosing between two polar modes of discourse,•• "communalism" 43
and "individualism. " 44 According to Professor Balkin, an individualist
"deemphasize[s] a person's responsibility for the effect of her behavior
on others" and a communalist emphasizes this responsiblity. 45 Each
37. See infra notes 422-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causation issues created under the new "seizure" definition.
38. See infra notes 415-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issue of
causation to stop under the new "seizure" definition.
39. See infra note 424 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causation
issue relating to an individual's injuries.
40. See infra notes 125, 128-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
police officers use physical force during pursuits.
41. See infra notes 127, 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
police officers use psychological force during pursuits.
42. Recently Professor Balkin discerned two modes of discourse in his attempt to
develop "a semiotics of legal discourse - that is, understanding legal discourse as a
system of interrelated signs, much like a language." Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 200 (1990).
43. Professor Balkin has defined "communalism'.' as a perspective that compels
one to characterize factual issues in a manner that deemphasizes the injured person's
responsiblity for the harm ~hat occurred and emphasizes the injurer's responsibility for
the harm. ld. at 207-211.
44. Professor Balkin has defined "individualism" as a perspective that compels
one to characterize factual issues in a manner that emphasizes the injured person's
responsiblity for the harm that occurred and deemphasizes the injurer's responsibility
for the harm. /d.
45. /d. at 207. Professor Ba'Ikin has recognized that the question of whether a
person was an injured party or the injuring party is also a question resolved by rhetoric.
/d. at 211. He has emphasized that factual characterization is the key to understanding
legal discourse about responsibility:
Terms like 'responsibility' or 'injury' require a context in which to be understood and used. To the extent that we can vary the context, or rather our
description of the context, we can vary the meaning of these terms . . . .
[W]ithout a grounding in a particular set of social assumptions, legal concepts like 'responsibility,' 'harm,' and 'injury,' threaten to become empty. By
varying our assumptions we can produce radically different conclusions
about who is harming whom, what is the relevant injury, and who is ultimately responsible for the injury.
/d. at 210.
Determining responsibility for harm is thus a question of how one characterizes
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perspective influences how one characterizes the underlying issues relating to the general issue of responsibility - actions, "intention, causation, free will, and available options."46 In the context of a pursuit,
the injured party, the plaintiff, generally adopts a communalist position
because this position emphasizes the responsibility of police officers for
their actions during pursuits and deemphasizes the individual's actions
during the pursuit. 47 In contrast, police officers, the defendants, generally adopt an individualist position because they emphasize the individual's responsibility for his actions during a pursuit and deemphasize the
officers' actions. 48 The particular viewpoint accepted by a court ultimately determines whether a pursuit is subject to constitutional
scrutiny. 49
Any court's determination of the constitutionality of pursuits entails a consideration of policy. This Article advocates that courts adopt
a communalist position in determining the constitutionality of pursuits
because a communalist position is consistent with the Supreme Court's
perspective as expressed in excessive force cases. 5° In evaluating the use
of force by officials, the Supreme Court has strongly protected an individual's interest in personal security. 111 Under a communalist perspective, pursuits would be permissible only when deadly force would be
authorized and the risk to the public is minimal. 112

facts. Balkin has identified rhetorical devices that courts use in describing the facts
relating to responsibility. /d. at 212-53. According to Balkin, a communalist perspective would compel the following factual characterizations: 1) emphasizing facts that
relate to the defendant's responsibility and deemphasizing facts that relate to the plaintiff's responsibility, 2) broadly characterizing inculpating facts about the defendant
that relate to causal probability and narrowly characterizing exculpating facts about
the defendant that relate to causal responsibility, 3) abstractly describing the defendant's actions concerning the foreseeability of harm and concretely describing the plaintiff's actions concerning the foreseeability of harm, 4) broadly describing the time
frame relating to the defendant's inculpatory conduct and narrowly describing the time
frame relating to the plaintiff's conduct, and 5} narrowly describing the options available to the plantiff and broadly describing the options available to the defendant. /d. An
individualist perspective would compel the opposite characterizations. Id. at 207, 21253.
46. Id. at 211.
47. See infra notes 84-90, 96-97 and accompanying text for an application of the
communalistic perspective to police pursuits.
48. See infra notes 78-83, 94-95 and accompanying text for an application of the
individualistic perpective to police pursuits.
49. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the individualist and communalist perspectives as applied to police pursuits.
50. See generally, Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989); Brower v. County
of lnyo, 490 U.S. 593 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see also infra
notes 224-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Supreme Court has
implicitly expressed a communalist perspective in evaluating excessive force claims.
51. Id.
52. See infra notes 84-90, 96-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
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Part II discusses the need to adopt a communalist perspective in
evaluating pursuits. 113 It contends that this perspective allows pursuits
to be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 114 Part III describes how police
officers use either physical or psychological force to cause injuries during pursuits. 1111 Part IV details the broad protection that the courts have
afforded to an individual's interest in personal security under the
fourth 116 and fourteenth 117 amendments. This section demonstrates that
most pursuits constitute the use of disproportionate force. Part V analyzes the three "seizure" definitions that the Supreme Court has articulated.118 The analysis reveals that the fourth amendment generally applies to the relationship between the police officers and the pursued
driver and his passengers because police officers "seize" these individuals within the meaning of the fourth amendment during a pursuit. 119
Further, the fourteenth amendment applies to the relationship between
police officers and other drivers, their passengers, and pedestrians because these individuals are not "seized" during a pursuit. 80 Part VI
indicates that the pursuit policies of many law enforcement agencies
are unconstitutional. Such policies may expose these agencies to civil
liability under section 1983.61 This Article concludes with a discussion
outlining ways to balance a government's need for police pursuits with
an individual's interest in personal security, as protected by both the
fourth and fourteenth amendments.

proper use of police pursuits from a communalistic perspective.
53. See infra notes 67-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to
apply a communalistic perspective to police pursuits.
54. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
communalist perspective, in contrast to the individualist perspective, allows police pursuits to be subject to constitutional scrutiny.
55. See infra notes 125-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how police
officers use physical or psychological force during a pursuit.
56. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to
personal security under the fourth amendment.
57. See infra notes 294-351 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right
to personal security under the fourteenth amendment.
58. See infra notes 357-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning of a fourth amendment "seizure."
59. See infra notes 380, 402-403, 432-33, 436-39 and accompanying text for an
application of the Supreme Court's "seizure" definition as applied to a pursued driver
and her passengers.
60. See infra notes 380, 402-03, 434 and accompanying text for an application of
the Supreme Court's "seizure" definition as applied to other motorists and pedestrians.
61. See generally City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.lO (1989)
("need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force ...
can be said to be 'so obvious,' that the failure to do so could properly be characterized
as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights").
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THE NEED TO SUBJECT POLICE PURSUITS TO CONSTITUTIONAL
SCRUTINY

Determining whether the practice of police pursuits should be subject to constitutional scrutiny under the fourth and fourteenth amendments is a question linked not only to constitutional doctrines 62 associated with these amendments but also to policy. Policy is implicated in
every court's examination of the constitutional doctrines associated
with pursuits, because enmeshed in all pursuit cases are complex social
issues of who should be responsible for the harm that arises from a
pursuit. 68 Scholars have sometimes referred to the contrasting policies
62. The constitutional doctrines associated with fourth amendment excessive
force claims focus upon whether police officers "seized" an individual and whether the
force used was disproportionate. In analyzing pursuit claims under the fourth amendment, some courts have avoided discussion of either of these constitutional doctrines
because they have determined that police do not use force during a pursuit. See, e.g.,
Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986) ("police used absolutely no force"
during pursuit). This narrow perspective fails to see how police officers are implicated
in the harm that pursuits present. A policy of strongly guarding against physical intrusions, however, would discern that police officers are implicated in the harm that occurs
during pursuits. This perspective is similar to the perspective Professor Balkin has described as "communalism." Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-11.
63. In determining whether police officers or the pursued driver caused the harm
that occurred as a result of a pursuit, many courts have attributed responsibility to the
pursued driver for the harm that he incurred. See, e.g.. Sutherland v. Holcombe, No.
89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990) (even though
police officers allegedly knew that driver and passenger would lose control of their vehicle as they began approaching a dangerous curve, police officers who failed to terminate the pursuit did not cause their deaths); Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262,
263 (8th Cir. 1989) (officers who pursued motorcylist and his passenger for failing to
wear helmets did not "seize" them within the meaning of the fourth amendment even
though pursuit ended in fatal accident; there was "no evidence that either of the police
cars collided with the motorcycle or innocent victim); Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F.
Supp. 1269, 1273 (N.D. Iowa 1987), appeal denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson,
845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 857 F.2d 502 (8th cir. 1988) (pursuit of
motorcyclist for failing to stop at a stop sign and for failing to have a headlight on was
constitutional under both fourth and fourteenth amendments because the motorcyclist
caused his own harm by crashing into another vehicle); Boren v. City of Colorado
Springs, 624 F. Supp. 474, 477 (D. Colo. 1985) (although the driver was pursued by an
unmarked police vehicle and even though officers did not have probable cause to believe
that the driver had violated any offense, driver who was in fear of his life caused his
own injury by leaving his vehicle); Veach v. Cross, 532 N.E.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (pursued driver, not police officers, caused the injury the passenger
incurred when the vehicle crashed into the ditch). Some courts have characterized the
facts in a manner to suggest that the pursuit did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987) (officers'
pursuit at speeds greater than 100 miles per hour of driver who had allegedly been
driving in an unsafe manner did not "rise to the level of gross negligence and outrageous conduct necessary to sustain a section 1983 claim"); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d
947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986) (even though police officer exceeded the speed limit by 15
miles per hour and failed to use his lights or sirens, his conduct amounted only to
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influencing decisions as "individualism" 64 and "communalism" 611 or "al·
truism." 66 An examination of these polar policies reveals that in the

negligence, not actionable under the fourth or fourteenth amendment); Roach v. City
of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (pursuit did not "rise to the level
of gross negligence"); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D.
Ark. 1989) ("[a]t some point, continued pursuit at high speeds in heavy traffic might
rise to the level of recklessness, but the brief chase here did not involve such disregard
of known dangers as to allow the plaintiffs to recover against the officer"). Some courts
have stated that a pursuit does not involve the use of any force. See, e.g., Brower v.
County Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1987) (police officers used no force during a
pursuit; decedent had the option of stopping before crashing into a roadbloek), rev'd,
489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986) (pursued driver's crash was not a "result of the officer's show of authority," but instead a
result of his loss of control of the vehicle when he crashed into a tree). Some courts
have not analyzed whether police officers use force during a pursuit and have instead
tersely concluded that the pursuit was reasonable. See, e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d at 297 (pursuit of vehicle with license plates registered to another
vehicle was reasonable, even though driver was killed and two persons in another car
were seriously injured); Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn. 1990) ("mere
pursuit, without more, [does not] constitute the exercise of unreasonable force"). Some
courts have also determined that police officers have no duty to refrain from pursuits,
regardless of the risk to the public. See, e.g., Jackson v. Olson, 712 P.2d 128, 130-31
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting majority rule that police officers have no duty to refrain
from pursuing drivers, even for misdemeanor offenses, "even when risk of harm to the
public arising from the chase is foreseeable").
Few courts have subjected pursuits to constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Brower v.
County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1317 n.l (9th Cir. 1989) (in dicta the court stated that
police officers may not be able to use the danger present during a pursuit as a reason
justifying their use of force); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 975 (1st Cir. 1986)
(city failed to properly train police officers about policies on the use of "high speed
chases"); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (passenger stated claim
under fourteenth amendment for psychological injury he received during pursuit initiated by police officers in an unmarked vehicle); Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1211
(5th Cir. 1985) (injured passenger stated claim under the fourth amendment when
police officer's used roadblock to stop driver who refused to terminate the pursuit);
Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 920-22 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (even
though officers did not directly use "physical force," they may be liable for the death of
a driver who lost control of his vehicle; jury will decide whether high-speed pursuit of a
speeding driver "amounted to an abuse of their police powers"); Wright v. District of
Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order granting partial summary judgment) (driver pursued by officers in unmarked vehicle stated a fourth amendment
claim for psychological injury caused by being in fear for her life); Travis v. City of
Mesquite, No. C-8576 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1990) (WESTLAW, State Library, Tex. file) (pursuit of person allegedly involved in prostitution may constitute "deliberate indifference"
to personal security rights of third parties who were injured and killed in violation of
fourteenth amendment).
·
64. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-211; see also infra notes 78-83, 94-95.
65. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-211; see also infra notes 84-90, 96-97.
66. Professor Balkin has stated that his theory of individualism and communalism is similar to Professor Duncan Kennedy's theory of individualism and altruism, a
theory Kennedy applied to contract law. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 202. In applying
Kennedy's theory to contract law, "denying contractual liability in the absence of con-
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context of police pursuits courts should adhere to a policy of communalism, because to do otherwise would be to allow the dangerous practice of pursuits to evade constitutional scrutiny.
A policy of communalism affords individuals more protection of
their right to personal security than does a policy of individualism.
Communalism recognizes that when a person is injured, 67 others may
be implicated in the harm that the person experienced; 68 individualism,
however, emphasizes that each person needs to protect himself from the
harm associated with the presence of others. 69 Because communalism
sideration was relatively individualist, while permitting recovery in cases of detrimental
reliance was relatively altruist." /d. at 203. The only difference between Kennedy's
theory and Balkin's is the manner in which each theory emphasizes or deemphasizes
excuses or defenses. /d. at 204. Under Kennedy's theory, individualism "deemphasize[s] both liability and the recognition of excuses and defenses, [and] altruism
emphasize[s] both liability and the recognition of excuses and defenses." Id. (emphasis
in original). Under Balkin's theory, although individualism similarly deemphasizes liability, it emphasizes, not deemphasizes, excuses or defenses because these are means of
diminishing liability in tort Jaw. /d.
67. Although determining that an individual was physically injured during a pursuit is not dependent upon how one characterizes the facts, Professor Balkin has noted
when an individual asserts that she was acting in self-defense, factual characterization
is central to determining whether the individual was the injured or the· injurer. See
Balkin, supra note 42, at 235-36 (questioning whether a battered wife who killed her
husband was the injured or injurer).
68. /d. at 206-07. Courts can find that other individuals were implicated in the
harm by using rhetorical devices that make their participation seem obvious. Id. at 210.
They can also conclude that others were not implicated by using the same rhetorical
devices, but in the opposite manner. Id. According to Professor Balkin, the following
rhetorical devices might be present in an opinion that represents a communalist perspective, one that would find that a defendant was implicated in the harm that occurred: 1) characterizing the facts to emphasize the defendant's responsibility and to
deemphasize the plaintiff's responsibility, 2) characterizing broadly inculpatory facts
relating to the defendant's link to the harm and narrowly characterizing exculpatory
facts relating to the defendant's distance from the harm, 3) using abstract terms to
describe the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 4) using a broad time frame to find
inculpatory facts relating to the defendant and a narrow time frame to find exculpatory
facts relating to the defendant, and 5) narrowly characterizing alternative ways for the
plaintiff to have acted and broadly characterizing the options available to the defendant. /d. at 202-52; see also id. at 252-53 for a concise chart summarizing the rhetorical
devices relating to the characterization of responsibility. See generally Note, Police
Liability for Creating the Need to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 1982, 1985 n.17 (1988) ("social policy considerations have persuaded courts to
find defendants liable for civil damages even in cases in which the line of causation
between the defendant's conduct and the injury is so indirect that defendant could not
have had any meaningful choice in causing the injury").
69. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-07. Courts can deemphasize the role of
others in causing harm by using rhetorical devices that make their involvement seem
remote. /d. at 210. The following rhetorical devices might be present in an opinion that
represents an individualist perspective, one that would find that a defendant was not
implicated in the harm that occurred: 1) ·characterizing the facts to deemphasize the
defendant's responsibility and emphasize the plaintiff's responsibility, 2) characterizing
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may provide the injured individual with compensation for the harm incurred, the availability of compensation may deter others in the future
from acting in a manner that threatens the safety of others. 70 Individualism, on the other hand, forces the harmed individual to incur the loss
without any compensation and fails to deter others from causing similar harm.
Although these simple contrasting perspectives seem removed from
constitutional analysis, Professor Balkin has cogently detailed how
these perspectives influence courts in deciding important legal issues. 71
For instance, courts may advance a perspective by using rhetorical devices that are hidden in the deep structures of an opinion. 72 Therefore,
understanding how courts may apply these devices aids in discerning
the need to adopt a communalist perspective of police pursuits.
The typical pursuit has different classes of injured persons: the
pursued driver, passengers· in the pursued vehicle, other drivers and
their passengers, and pedestrians. The perspective one adopts may depend upon how one perceives the culpability of the particular injured
person. To group these plaintiffs according to culpability would result
in two classes: the culpable plaintiff- the pursued driver, who violated
a law by fleeing - and nonculpable plaintiffs - the pursued's passengers and other persons harmed who have done nothing to engender the
pursuit.
When passengers, motorists, ·and pedestrians are injured, the central issue is who is responsible, 78 the pursued driver or the police ofnarrowly inculpatory facts relating to the defendant's link to the harm and characterizing broadly the exculpatory facts relating to the defendant's proximity to the harm, 3)
using concrete terms to describe the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; 4) using
a narrow time frame to find inculpatory facts relating to the defendant and a broad
time frame to find exculpatory facts relating to the defendant, and 5) broadly characterizing the alternative ways for the plaintiff to have acted and narrowly characterizing
the options available to the defendant. /d. at 202-52; see also id. at 252-53 for a concise chart summarizing the rhetorical devices relating to the characterization of
responsibility.
70. Jeffries, Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation to Risk in
Constitutional Torts, 15 VA. L. REV. 1461, 1462-63 (1989).
71. See Balkin, supra note 42.
72. /d. at 200.
73. The term "responsible" implies that ultimate liability may lie with either the
police officers or the pursued driver. Although Professor Balkin indicates how courts
use rhetorical devices to determine the ultimate issue of liability, the devices also apply
to issues related to the ultimate issue, such as causation. /d. at 240-46. This Article
discusses Professor Balkin's theory, not as a means to impose liability upon police officers for the harm that arises from pursuits, but instead to subject pursuits to constitutional scrutiny under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Professor Balkin's theory
is helpful in the pursuit context to aid courts in discerning that police officers use either
physical or psychological force during a pursuit and that this force can cause injuries to
the pursued drivers and others. Adopting a communalist perspective would allow pursuit claims to be subject to constitutional scrutiny to determine whether the force police
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fleers who pursued the driver. When police cruisers crash into one of
these individuals, causation is not in issue because the police officers
directly caused the harm. 74 When the pursued's vehicle inflicts the
harm, the causation question, however, is complex. The actions of the
pursued driver cannot be subject to constitutional scrutiny because the
driver is a private actor, not a state official.7 6 The actions of police
officers do, however, signify the presence of state action. 76 Thus the
officers' actions may be subject to constitutional scrutiny, but only if a
court finds them to be causally implicated in the harm.
Resolving the issue of causation depends upon how one characterizes the facts, whether it is from a communalist or individualist perspective.77 When police officers are the defendants, the individualist

officers use is actually disproportionate to the need. Many courts have failed to discern
that police officer use any force; thus, they never need to determine whether the alleged
force caused any injuries and whether the force used was disproportionate to the need
for it. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text for these issues and how courts
have resolved them.
74. Causation is not an issue, however, only to the degree that the facts cannot
be subject to an interpretation that the pursued driver was somehow responsible for the
officer's cruiser hitting her. According to Professor Balkin, if facts can be subject to
different interpretations, then courts may resolve the causation issue either under a
communalist perspective or an individualist perspective. Balkin, supra note 42, at 24046.
75. A remedy under state law may be available, but this remedy can be without
any force if the pursued driver has no assets. The profile of the typical pursued driver
indicates that the driver is generally a young male. See, e.g., H. NUGENT, E. CONNORS,
J. MCEWEN & L. MAYO, RESTRICTIVE POLICIES FOR HIGH-SPEED POLICE PURSUITS 17
(1989) (almost 60% of pursued drivers were between the ages of 18 and 25; 96% were
males); Beckman, Identifying Issues in Police Pursuits: The First Research Findings,
54 POLICE CHIEF 57, 60 (1987) (82% of suspects were between the ages of 11 and 30;
96% were males).
The private person's actions can signify state action when the person acts jointly
with a state official. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)
(state action may be present if private restaurant owner conspired with police officers).
A pursued driver, however, acts as an adversary to the police officers and thus she is
not a state actor. See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-326 (1981)
(public defender does not act jointly with a state, even though paid by the state for the
legal services he provided, because the defender acts as an adversary to state).
76. For the purpose of claims brought under section 1983, whenever a plaintiff
has established state action he also has established action "under color of [state] law."
See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982) ("the undercolor-of-state-law requirement does not add anything not already included within the
state-action requirement of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment").
If federal officials abuse the power they have under federal law, their actions constitute federal action and they may be subject to liability for a violation of an individual's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (federal officials liable for violating an
individual's fourth amendment right to be free from an an unlawful search and
seizure).
77. See generally Balkin, supra note 42, at 240-43 (discussing rhetorical devices
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perspective shifts the responsibility of the harm to the pursued driver,
but the communalist perspective allows courts to see how the police
officers are implicated in the harm.
From an individualist perspective, a court would characterize the
facts in a manner that would suggest that responsibility follows naturally from the facts it emphasizes. The court would declare that the
pursued driver was in control of the pursuit - he could have stopped
the pursuit at anytime. 78
This perspective also would emphasize that it was the pursued
driver's vehicle, not the police officers' cruiser, that physically produced
the harm. 79 In addition, it would emphasize the pursued driver's inculpatory conduct in failing to follow the officers' command to stop. 80 To

that enable courts to resolve the issue of causation in the manner that furthers either
an individualist or a communalist perspective).
78. One rhetorical device focuses on the free will of an individual and the options
available to him. ld. at 233-46. From an individualist perspective, one would characterize the plaintiff's options broadly and the defendant's options narrowly. Id.; see, e.g.,
Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (N.D. Iowa), appeal denied sub
nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 857 F.2d
502 (8th Cir. 1988). In Tagstrom, a federal court used an individualist perspective as it
discussed the issue of free will and causation:
The Court believes that the proper focus should be upon the nature of the
[officers') acts, rather than the risk created or the foreseeability of the harm.
The pursuit, by itself, did not limit the plaintiff's ability to protect himself
from harm in the same way in which a shot or attempt to run him down
would limit that ability. At all times the plaintiff retained the ability to
lower or eliminate the risk of injury by slowing down or stopping. Instead,
he appears to have preferred the risk of injury over the risk of apprehension
and suffered the consequences of that choice. Because the Court cannot find
that the plaintiff was forced to make that choice, it cannot find that the
[officers] ... used excessive force or any. force.
Id. Although the court states that the focus is on the police officers' conduct, it actually
characterized the facts to emphasize the plaintiff's inculpatory act of fleeing. The court
deemphasized the officers' role in the pursuit by finding that the police officers may not
have even used "any force" during the pursuit. Similarly, it focused on the plaintiff's
options, not the officers' option of terminating the risk of harm.
79. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 263 (8th Cir. 1989)
(there was "no evidence that either of the police cars collided with the motorcycle or
the innocent victim"). One rhetorical device relates to emphasis and deemphasis of
facts relating to responsibility. Balkin, supra note 42, at 202-12. From an individualist
perspective, one would emphasize facts relating to the plaintiff's responsibility and
deemphasize facts relating to the defendant's responsiblity. Id.
80. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1987) (pursued driver had "numerous opportunities to stop" pursuit before he crashed into a
roadblock), rev'd, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989). One rhetorical device characterizes events
either broadly or narrowly depending upon whether they are inculpatory or exculpatory. Balkin, supra note 42, at 212-20. Under an individualist perspective, one would
broadly characterize inculpatory events relating to the plaintiff and exculpatory events
relating to the defendant; one would also narrowly characterize exculpatory events relating to the plaintiff and inculpatory events relating to the defendant. Id.

1991]

HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS

221

the same degree that it emphasizes facts associated with the pursued
driver's blameworthy conduct, it would deemphasize the police officers'
role in the pursuit. 81 By using concrete language, a court adhering to
an individualist perspective would state that the police officers could
not have foreseen the specific accident, nor could they have known who
in particular would be injured. 82 In addition, it would deemphasize that
police officers have the option to decide whether they should pursue an
individual under the circumstances. 88
A communalist perspective, however, reverses the emphasis and
adopts the opposite characterization. From a communalistic perspective, a court would declare that the police officers were in control of the
pursuit. 8 " The officers could not only determine whether to initiate a
pursuit but also when to terminate the pursuit if it became apparent
that the danger of harm was too great. 811 By using abstract language,
81. See supra notes 78-80 for a discussion of this rhetorical device; see also Britt
v. Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp. 189, 194 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (deemphasizes
police officer's role in the pursuit). In Britt, a federal court factually characterized the
police officer's role from an individualist perspective:
The officer pursued in a chase that lasted about a minute, including a brief
period of time when the stolen car was stopped and apparently out of gear.
There was initially not much traffic, and the officer was on the verge of
breaking off the pursuit when the accident occurred. He did not see the
actual accident because the stolen car had disappeared through a dust cloud.
Id. The court deemphasizes the officer's role during the pursuit by highlighting the
short duration of the pursuit, the officer's assertion that he was just about to terminate
the pursuit, and the distance between the officer's vehicle and the crash. Studies have
indicated, however, that accidents are as likely to happen during pursuits of short duration as they are during pursuits of longer duration. See supra note 1.
82. See e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1989)
(officer "did not intend for the pursuit to end by means of an accident with another
vehicle"). One rhetorical device relates to characterization of the foreseeability of
harm. Balkin, supra note 42, at 221-227. Under an individualist perspective, one would
use concrete language to describe whether the defendant could have foreseen the specific harm and abstract language to describe whether the plaintiff could have foreseen
the general harm. Id.
83. See, e.g., Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987) (whether the
officers chose to pursue or not to pursue, they could have been exposed to a lawsuit for
their actions or for their failure to act); see also supra note 69.
84. See, e.g., Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Ga. 1986)
(police officers may be liable for failing to terminate pursuit, even though the pursued
driver was injured when he lost control of his car and hit a tree). The rhetorical device
associated with this characterization relates to an individual's free will and options. See
supra note 72. Under a communalist perspective, one would characterize the plaintiff's
options narrowly and the defendant's options broadly. Balkin, supra note 42, at 233-46.
85. See, e.g., Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. at 922 ("officers may
have been negligent and/or reckless in failing to break-off the chase and arrest [the
driver] at a later time when it would have been safer for all concerned"). The rhetorical device associated with this characterization is the perspective on foreseeability of
harm. See supra note 76. Under a communalist perspective, one would use abstract
language to describe whether the defendant could have foreseen the general harm and
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the court would find the accident was foreseeable by stressing the inherently dangerous nature of pursuits in general. 86 The opinion would
characterize the police officers as using psychological force, 87 force that
compels a pursued driver to continue his flight as his adrenalin increases and his judgment decreases. 88 The court would deemphasize the
concrete language to describe whether the plaintiff could have -foreseen the specific
harm. Balkin, supra note 42, at 221-27.
86. Some recent police pursuit policies indicate a communalist perspective when
discussing the dangerousness of pursuits. See, e.g., Butler County, Emergency Operation of Sheriff's Office Vehicles (Dec. 13, 1989) ("foremost thought in the officer's
mind must always be SAFETY"; pursuit is justified only when the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the pursuit") (emphasis in
original). See supra note 68.
87. See, e.g.. Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (psychological
injury is actionable for fear arising from pursuit in an unmarked vehicle). In Checki,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the police officers' inculpatory acts in
determining that psychological force itself is actionable, even if the plaintiff receives no
physical injury:
It cannot reasonably be argued that no serious physical danger confronts
civilians who are forced to travel at speeds over 100 mph in their attempt to
flee a terrorizing police officer. Furthermore, there is no valid reason for
insisting on physical injury before a section 1983 claim can be stated in this
context. A police officer who terrorizes a civilian by brandishing a cocked
gun in front of that civilian's face may not cause physical injury, but he has
certainly laid the building blocks for a section 1983 action against him. Similarly, where a police officer uses a police vehicle to terrorize a civilian, and
he has done so with malicious abuse of official power shocking to the conscience, a court may conclude that the officers have crossed the constitutional line.
Id. (emphasis in original). The court uses a communalist perspective by comparing the
use of a speeding vehicle to the use of a cocked gun. It implicitly emphasizes the forseeability of psychological harm and explicitly emphasizes the foreseeablity of physical
harm, even though the plaintiff was never physically injured. The court thus determined that the officers' use of psychological force was actionable under the fourteenth
amendment. See also infra notes 139-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of
how police officers use psychological force during pursuits.
88. The rhetorical device associated with this characterization relates to an individual's free will and the options available to him. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 23346. Under a communalist perspective, one would characterize the plaintiff's options
narrowly and the defendant's options broadly. Id.
Pursuits also have a psychological effect upon some police officers. Barker, Police
Pursuit Driving: The Need for Policy, 51 POLICE CHIEF 70, 72 (1984) (studies reveal
that "bad judgment shootings occur more often in pursuit situations than in apprehension without pursuits"). Some officers may experience "pursuit fixation," which has
been defined as "becoming so engrossed in the apprehension of a fleeing violator that
the safety of others is forgotten or ignored." Id. at 70. This fixation compels officers to
have a "'run them until they wreck' mentality." Id. One study has indicated that
young male officers are more likely to conduct unnecessary and danger pursuits. See
Alpert & Dunham, supra note 1, at 532, 537 ("aggressiveness of the younger male
officers is a characteristic not conducive to efficient and safe pursuits"; chases initiated
by female officers resulting in personal injury are 50% less likely to occur than chases
initiated by male officers). The adrenalin they experience may explain their combative
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pursued driver's refusal to stop by narrowing the time frame to focus
on the harm as arising from the officers' decision to continue the pursuit.89 It would also deemphasize the driver's ability to stop once the
pursuit has begun. 90 In short, the communalist perspective focuses attention on the police officers' actions, but the individualist perspective
focuses attention on the pursued driver's actions.
The shifting emphasis of the rhetorical device also is apparent
when the situation involves only two parties, the pursued driver, who is
injured, and the police officer. 91 Although Professor Balkin has identified five distinct rhetorical devices 92 for this situation, the application of

behavior. See International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference Report, 44
CRIM. L. REP. 2136 (1988) (a Maryland assistant attorney general stated that "[i]n far
too many pursuits cases ... the offense that precipitated the chase was 'contempt of
cop' - that is, the officer's ego says, I won't let him outrun me"). See generally Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Minn. 1990) (police officers stopped a pursued
farmer's pickup truck at 2:00 a.m. by surrounding it with police vehicles after having
collided with it earlier; after farmer exited from truck, an officer unnecessarily shot the
truck's tires and threatened to kill the farmer); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968,
971 (1st Cir. 1986) (after the pursuit ended, a police officer handcuffed the driver and
"repeatedly [beat him] about his head, neck and shoulders with his revolver").
89. One police association has crafted .guidelines for terminating pursuits that
represent a communalist perspective. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF PoLICE MODEL POLICY: VEHICULAR PURSUIT (1989). The guidelines generally provide
that "[a] decision to terminate pursuit may be the most rational means of preserving
the lives and property of both the public, and the officers and suspects engaged in a
pursuit." /d.
One rhetorical device is to characterize the applicable time frame either narrowly
or broadly, depending upon whether the events are inculpatory or exculpatory. Balkin,
supra note 42, at 228-33. Under a communalist perspective, one would broadly characterize time to include inculpatory events related to the defendant and exculpatory
events related to the plaintiff; one would also narrowly characterize time to include
exculpatory events related to the defendant and inculpatory events related to the plain·
tiff. !d.
90. The rhetorical device associated with this characterization relates to an individual's free will and options. See supra note 69.
91. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 202-46. The rhetorical devices discussed above
apply to any factual characterization, whether the disputed event involves two or three
individuals. /d. at 246.
92. The following are some of the rhetorical devices Professor Balkin has identified: I) factual characterization emphasizing or deemphasizing responsibility, 2) factual characterization broadly or narrowly describing causal probability, 3) abstract or
concrete descriptions of foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 4) narrow or broad time
frames of fact relating to inculpatory or exculpatory facts, and 5) broad or narrow
characterization of free will. /d. at 202-46.
The first device is factual characterization. A court with a communalist perspective would emphasize the facts that implicate the police officers in the harm arising
from a pursuit and deemphasize the facts that focus on the pursued driver's responsibility. See supra notes 84-90, 96-97 and accompanying text. In the context of a pursuit,
this rhetorical device is important in characterizing who causes a pursuit to occur.
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these devices is similar to the three-party situation. 93
The individualist perspective would detail how the driver is implicated in the harm he incurred, but the communalistic perspective
would emphasize the police officers' actions. 94 The individualist perspective would emphasize the driver's culpable conduct of fleeing from
the officers, the driver's option911 of stopping either at the time the police officers signalled or after the pursuit began, and the link between
the act of fleeing and the harm. It would deemphasize the police officers' decision to pursue and any control the officers have over the pursued. The communalist perspective, however, would emphasize that police officers used psychological force during a pursuit, that this force is
linked to the harm that the pursued driver incurred, and that bodily
injury is a foreseeable event. The communalist perspective thus deemphasizes the driver's culpable conduct in order to view more broadly
the police officers' role during a pursuit. The need to scrutinize police
pursuits is apparent when considering three aspects of pursuits: (1) the
potential harm present during pursuits,96 (2) the reason that police officers generally pursue, and (3) the availability of other means either to
apprehend individuals or to stop the need for pursuits. 97
93. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 202-46.
94. See id.
95. An individualist perspective broadly characterizes the pursued driver's op- .
tions and narrowly describes the police officers options. See, e.g.• Jones v. Sherrill, 827
F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987). In Jones, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals used an
individualist perspective to describe the alternatives available to the pursued driver and
officers:
The officers made a choice to protect the public safety by attempting to
apprehend an obviously dangerous driver. Although the pursuit ended tragically, the officers may have averted equal or greater tragedy by halting [the
driver] when they did rather than allowing him to continue driving. Indeed,
had the officers not pursued [the driver] and had his unimpeded progress
resulted in a fatal accident, as it well could have, the officers might be facing a different section 1983 claim based on their failure to act ....
/d. The court thus narrowly defined the officers' options by determining that they may
have a duty to pursue. The Supreme Court, however, has recently held that state officials have no duty to protect individuals against harm from third parties. DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989). See infra notes
185-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
96. Foreseeability of harm, however, is subject to either a communalist perspective or an individualist perspective: an individualist perspective questions whether the
specific harm was foreseeable and a communalist perspective questions whether harm
was foreseeable. See supra note 69. Because the Supreme Court has broadly protected
an individual's interest in personal security, a communalist perspective on this aspect of
pursuits seems appropriate. See infra notes 224-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's protection of the right to personal security.
97. A discussion of the availability of other means signifies the use of a rhetorical
device that furthers a communalist perspective. See supra note 68. To focus on the
options available to police officers is to deemphasize the options available to the pursued driver. The Supreme Court has frequently scrutinized the means that police of-
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All pursuits represent an event in which someone may either be
seriously injured or killed. 98 The injured is not necessarily the individual who is fleeing from the officers' assertion of authority. The pursued
driver may have passengers who have not consented to the placing of
their lives in danger. 99 In addition, pursuits also may result in other
drivers, their passengers, or pedestrians being injured or killed. Under
an individualist perspective, captive passengers, other drivers, and
pedestrians need to take actions to protect themselves from the harm
arising from the pursuits. Crowded roads and sidewalks, however, as
well as other circumstances, may not permit some of these individuals
an avenue of escape from the harm. Under a communalist perspective,
one may see that the police officers' conduct is at least implicated in
the harm created by the pursuit. To find, as some individualist courts
have done, that police officers do not use force during a pursuit is to
allow all pursuits to evade scrutiny. 100
The need for scrutiny is even more obvious when considering the
typical reason that police officers conduct pursuits. The most common
reason police officers pursue is to apprehend an individual who has
committed a traffic offense. 101 Even though some traffic offenses, such
as speeding, may at first appear to warrant police intervention to stop
the danger presented to others, police intervention can increase rather
than lessen the danger. 102 In addition, police officers have pursued indi-

ficers have used when these means threaten to infringe an individual's interest in personal security. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of the serious risks
associated with police pursuits.
99. Some courts have failed to see how police officers are implicated in the harm
that a passenger incurs when the pursued driver's car crashes. See, e.g.. Veach v. Cross,
532 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). In Veach, the state court characterized
the passenger as a person over whom the police officers had no control; any injury that
she incurred came as a result of the pursued driver. Id. at 1073. Under state law, the
court declared, the police officers have no duty to protect individuals from private violence,, as demonstrated by the pursued driver's act of fleeing. /d. Although the court's
interpretation of state law is correct, the court fails to characterize the facts in a manner that reveals how police officers are implicated in the harm. Police officers increase
the risk of harm by using psychological force during pursuits. See infra notes 139-76
for a discussion of the use of psychological force during pursuits.
100. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 2.
102. See infra notes 139-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
psychological force during pursuits.
Some pursuit policies allow police officers to pursue drivers who appear to be intoxicated. See, e.g., Metropolitan Police, Boston, Mass., General Order 4.4.4, §§ 2.10,
3.0 (July 16, 1990) ("operating under the influence of drugs or alcohol" is a "lifethreatening offense" justifying a pursuit). See generally Metropolitan Police, Boston,
Mass., Statistical Summary on Pursuits 5 (Aug. 9, 1989) (54% of drivers pursued in
Boston from April 1, 1989 through June 30, 1989 were charged with operating under
the influence of alcohol). Although drivers who are intoxicated do present a danger to
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viduals who have violated a safety law, such as failing to wear a helmet108 or failing to turn on headlights. 104 By pursuing the individual
not wearing the required helmet, police officers increase the risk of
harm present to the driver and thus thwart the purpose of the safety
law. Similarly, by pursuing the individual driving without headlights,
police officers increase the risk of harm present to others on the road
and pedestrians.
Other means are available to apprehend drivers. Police officers
may maintain an effective pursuit of a driver by using a helicopter or
small airplane. 1011 These means allow for constant surveillance without
the risk of harm to the driver, police officers, and others in the driver's
path. Sometimes spike belts 108 may be a means of stopping an individual. When the pursued driver travels over a spike belt that police officers have laid in his path, the punctured tires of the pursued vehicle
gradually lose air and compel the driver to stop. 107 In addition, legislatures could create a rebuttable inference that the owner of a pursued
vehicle was the driver of the vehicle. 108 When they know the identity of

others, pursuing someone believed to have impaired physical skills and judgment increases the danger presented by the impaired driver. See Volusia County, Florida Departmental Standards Directive§ 41.2.2 (Feb. 15, 1990) (pursuing an impaired driver
"compounds the danger to the public"). Better means are available to stop drunk drivers. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2483-84 (1990)
(sobriety checkpoints for stopping motorists do not violate the fourth amendment); see
id. at 2496 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (purpose of sobriety checkpoint was not to be an
effective means of apprehending intoxicated drivers but to deter people from driving
after drinking).
103. See Webbs v. Hyans, No. 88-3180 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, Federal library, Court of Appeals file).
104. Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (N.D. Iowa 1987), appeal
denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part,
857 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988).
105. See, e.g., A. STONE & S. DELUCA, POLICE ADMINISTRATION: AN INTRODUCATION 415 (1985). Air surveillance reduces the risk of injury to the driver, police
officers, other motorists, and pedestrians. Because the pursued driver frequently will not
know that he· is being pursued, he will "slow down as soon as the pursuing patrol car is
out of sight." /d. Air surveillance also increases the likelihood of apprehension because
officers can prepare to intercept the driver. /d.
106. See Markell, Spike Belts: A Suitable Alternate to High Speed Pursuits?
389 lNT'L CRIM. PoLICE REv. 161, 162 (1985). A spike belt consists of "two or more
rows of hollow spikes inserted in a four-ply, woven rubber belting with segmented
metal backing. The spikes are case hardened, the tips of which are ground to a fifteen
degree angle and then teflon coated to allow easier penetration." /d.
107. /d. Police officers successfully used the belts in the Province of Alberta. /d.
108. This policy has been proposed by civil rights advocate Jerry LaCross, whose
daughter was a bystander killed as a result of a pursued driver's vehicle crashing into
her, a death witnessed by the victim's mother. J. LaCross, Remarks at Conference on
Police Pursuits: New Horizons in Law Enforcement Driver Training (July 17, 1990).
Some police officers, however, have conducted pursuits even when they know who the
offender is and that he has not committed a serious offense. See, e.g., Richardson v.
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the violator, police officers may use other means to arrest the individual. Similarly, states could adopt programs that educate young drivers,
· who are frequently the individuals fleeing from police, 109 about the extreme dangers associated with police pursuits.
One should adopt a communalist perspective in analyzing the constitutional issues arising from pursuits by recognizing the danger that
all pursuits entail and the needless harm that often occurs as a result of
pursuits. A communalist perspective allows courts to focus attention on
the conduct of police officers during pursuits. This communalist perspective is particularly appropriate in the pursuit context because the
Supreme Court has implicitly adopted this viewpoint when analyzing
the scope of the right to personal security under the fourth 110 and fourteenth amendments. 111

Ill.

THE UsE OF PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCE DURING
PURSUITS CAN CAUSE INJURIES

When individuals seek recovery for the harm caused as a result of
a pursuit, the essense of their claim is that the police officers used disproportionate force in violation of the fourth 112 or fourteenth amendment.113 Determining whether force is disproportionate is both similar
City of Indianapolis, 658 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945
(1982); Reed v. County of Allegan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 n.4 (W. D. Mich. 1988).
109. See, e.g., H. NuGENT, E. CoNNORS, J. McEwEN & L. MAYO, supra note
75, at 17 (almost 60% of pursued drivers were between the ages of 18 and 25; 96%
were males); Beckman, supra note 75, at 60 (82% of suspects were between the ages
of 11 and 30; 96% were males). Some pursuit policies, recognizing that young drivers
are often the ones attempting to flee, have adopted a restrictive pursuit policy. See
Volusia County, Florida Departmental Standards Directive § 41.2.2 (Feb. 15, 1990)
("many persons who flee from law enforcement officers while operating motor vehicles
are youthful and do so because of drivers license violations and other non-violent
crimes").
110. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's broad protection of the right to personal security under the fourth
amendment.
111. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's broad protection of the right to personal security under the fourteenth
amendment.
112. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989);
Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 263 (8th Cir. 1989); Galas v. McKee, 801
F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986); Wright v. District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C.
June 21, 1990) (order granting partial summary judgment); Reed v. County of Allegan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1241-43 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d
31, 36 (Minn. 1990).
113. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294,
296-97 (8th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1987);
Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp.
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to and different from the task of resolving the typical fourth or fourteenth amendment excessive force claim. The typical fourth amend·
ment claim includes allegations that officers unnecessarily used their
weapons 114 or physical force 1111 in arresting an individual. The typical
fourteenth amendment claim includes allegations that officers used disproportionate force during pretrial detention. 118 A pursuit claim is different from these excessive force claims because some courts have ques-

189, 192-95 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 92022 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
114. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. l, 3-7 (1985) (gun used to kill
fleeing felon); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (lst Cir. 1990) (officer
who shot at hostage in escaping vehicle was negligent); Fargo v. City of San Juan
Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1988) (officer was grossly negligent when
his gun accidentally discharged); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d l, 8 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988) (officer was not negligent when his gun
accidentally discharged); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (lith Cir.
1985) (en bane) (shooting was unreasonable because officer could not have reasonably
thought his life was in danger); Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d 101, 104-05 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986) (officer was not negligent when his gun accidentally
discharged as he slipped on ice); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232-34 (4th Cir.
1970) (accidental shooting constituted reckless conduct).
115. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1867-71 (1989) (physical
force during an investigatory stop); Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. at 599 (physical force by establishing a roadblock); Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 478-80 (5th
Cir. 1989) (physical force during an arrest); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706,
714 (7th Cir. 1987) (physical force during arrest).
116. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 903 F. 2d 400, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1990) (facts
surrounding struggle between detainee and law enforcement officers in dispute; officers
claimed that they acted in self-defense); White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th
Cir. 1990); Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d. 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (force occurred at
jail after the detainee was booked); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the fourteenth amendment protects the right to personal security for pretrial detainees; it has not, however, determined "whether the [f]ourth amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which
arrest ends and pretrial detention begins." Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.lO. Lower
courts appear to be extending the reach of the fourth amendment beyond the point of
actual arrest. See, e.g., Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (fourth
amendment applies to force used prior to time plaintiff was arraigned or formally
charged); Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989) (force used in administering a blood test at the hospital after the plaintiff was arrested); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (force used in "effecting and maintaining" arrest), cert. denied sub nom. City of Fayetteville v. Spell, 484 U.S. 1027
(1988); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (force used while an
arrestee was "in the custody of the arresting officers"). One writer has proposed the
following bright-line rule: "In warrantless arrests, the rule would define the end of a
seizure as the first appearance of the suspect before a judicial officer for a probable
cause hearing[;] [i]n warrant arrests, the end of a seizure would be the first appearance
before a judicial officer." Note, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When
Does Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 824 (1990).
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tioned whether police officers use force during a pursuit, 117 and if they
do, whether the officers, rather than the pursued driver, caused the alleged injuries. 118 In the typical excessive force case, the parties do not
dispute that police officers used force 119 and only sometimes do they
dispute whether the force used caused a particular injury. 120 Instead,
the focus of an excessive force claim is whether the circumstances justified the degree of force used by the officers. 121 In this respect, pursuit
claims and excessive force claims are similar. Both question whether
officers used disproportionate force.
Whether pursuits violate the disproportionality standards of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments thus requires consideration of three
related issues: whether police officers used force during a pursuit;m if
so, whether this force caused a particular injury; 128 and if so, whether
the circumstances justified the degree of force applied. 124 An examination of these specific issues, however, should include an understanding
of how policy implicitly affects resolution of these issues. An analysis of
these issues reveals that most pursuits constitute the use of disproportionate force.

117. See infra notes 125-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
force during pursuits.
118. See infra notes 171-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causation issue in police pursuits.
119. When police officers shoot during an arrest, the use of force is not disputed.
See supra note 114 (collecting cases in which plaintiff challenged the reasonableness of
using deadly force during an arrest). When suspect and police officers engage in physical combat, the plaintiff typically alleges that the force used was unreasonable. See
supra note 114. Officers often assert that the force used was necessary either to control
the suspect or to protect themselves from the suspect. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109
S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (1989) (officer claimed that physical force was necessary to control
the suspect); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989) (officers claimed that
roadblock was necessary to apprehend fleeing driver); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
4 (1985) (officer claimed that shooting was necessary to apprehend fleeing burglar suspect); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane)
(officer claimed shooting was in self-defense), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986), cert.
denied sub nom. Sampson v. Gilmore, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986).
120. In a case where more than one police officer shoots at the plaintiff, there
may be a question of which officer's bullet caused the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., Kibbe
v. Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 802-03 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 257
(1987) (ten officers involved in three shootings).
121. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
fourth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the use of disproportionate force.
122. See supra notes 112-70 and accompanying text for discussion of the force
police officers use during pursuits.
.
123. See infra notes 171-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
force police officers use during pursuits may cause harm to the pursued driver, his
passengers, other motorists, and pedestrians.
124. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disproportionality standards of the fourth and fourteenth amendments as applied to
pursuits.
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A. The Act of Pursuing Constitutes the Potential Use of Deadly
Force

During a pursuit, police officers may use two different types of
force, physical force and psychological force. Physical force is apparent
when police officers use their cruisers to collide with an individual's
vehicle. In this situation, the use of force is obvious because the collision produces a visible mark of force, whether it is a dent or a totalled
car. 1211 When the cruisers do not actually touch the individual's vehicle,128 then they may have used psychological force, force that causes
an individual to continue to flee even though there is a substantial risk
of harm to himself and others. 127 An examination of these two types of
force indicates that some pursuits involve the use of physical force and
that all pursuits involve the use of psychological force.
1.

Use of Physical Force

Officers may use physical force during a pursuit in two ways. First,
125. See, e.g., Kuhar v. Hanton No. 86-4110 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1988) (table published 836 F.2d 1348) (police officers' cruiser collided with motorcylist); Benskin v.
Addison Township, 635 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (N.D. IJI. 1986) (police officers acted
maliciously in causing a direct collision, which resulted in severe injuries). Even when
the use of physical force is obvious, what caused an injury may nevertheless be disputed. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Harris, 490 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1987) (police officers "rammed the fleeing suspect's car,
locked fenders with it, and forced it off the road into a bus bench [killing a
bystander]").
.
Using a vehicle to stop a fleeing suspect is similar to using a roadblock to stop his
flight. Recently the United States Supreme Court recognized that police officers use
physical force when they set up a roadblock to stop a fleeing suspect. Brower v. County
of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989). Other courts have similarly recognized that a
roadblock constitutes the use of force. See, e.g, Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1207
(5th Cir. 1985) (passenger was severely injured as driver crashed into roadblock); Reed
v. County of Allegan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1240, 1245 (W. D. Mich. 1988) (crash into
roadblock resulted in suspect becoming a quadriplegic); City of Amarillo v. Langley,
651 S.W.2d 906, 911 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (suspects were seriously injured when their
motorcycle crashed into roadblock; second motorcylist who swerved around roadblock
was seriously injured when he collided with a parked car).
126. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989)
(pursued driver and passenger killed when driver hit a bump and flew through the air,
crashing into a utility pole); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 295 (8th
Cir. 1989) (pursued driver died and passengers were seriously injured when pursued
driver lost control of vehicle and crashed into oncoming motorist); Patterson v. City of
Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 262 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (motorcyclist and passenger
killed when motorcyclist lost control); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.
1987) (motorist was killed when pursued's vehicle crossed center line and crashed into
his vehicle); Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D. Ga. 1986)
(pursued driver lost control of vehicle and crashed into tree).
127. See infra notes 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
psychological force during police pursuits.
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they may intentionally use their cruiser to crash into the individual's
vehicle. 128 This situation implicates the fourth amendment because the
officers' conduct does not signify mere negligence. 129 By intentionally
using a cruiser to stop a fleeing individual, the officers have used force
that is potentially deadly. 130 The use of a cruiser in this manner is like
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
129. In defining what constitutes a fourth amendment "seizure," the United
States Supreme Court recently stated that to effectuate a "seizure" police officers must
have "intentionally applied" the means that caused an individual to stop. Brower v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). The Court explained that the question of
intent relates to the means that the officers have applied, not a subjective desire to
cause a particular result. Id. at 598. Under. the fourth amendment, the question of
"intent" only relates to the question of whether officers "seized" an individual. See
infra notes 367-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes a
fourth amendment "seizure." Intent is not relevant to determining whether the force
used was disproportionate under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor,
109 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 (1989) ("fourth amendment inquiry is one of 'objective reasonableness' under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like 'malice' and 'sadism'
have no proper place in that inquiry"); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712
(7th Cir. 1987) ("fourth amendment standard calls for objective analysis without regard to the officer's underlying intent or motivation.").
Some courts have failed to distinguish negligent conduct from reckless or intentional actions. See, e.g., Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (11th Cir. 1986). In Cannon,
a police officer, traveling 15 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit, killed another
driver when he crashed at an intersection. /d. at 948. Even though the officer was
driving an unmarked car and he failed to use his siren, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that officer was only negligent. /d. at 949. The 6fficer, however, had
been charged with vehicular homicide. Id. at 951. By characterizing the conduct as
negligence, the federal court was able to dismiss the action and send the plaintiff to
state court to seek recovery. The court stated, "Automobile negligence actions are grist
for the state law mill. But they do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation."
/d. at 950. Such characterization, however, is another example of how courts have
narrowed the protection available under section 1983 by restrictively interpreting the
underlying constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests
on the Law of Federal Courts, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 499, 502-03 (1989). Professor
Wells states: "Although the Court invokes the conventional tools of judicial decision
making, . . . the results reflect a strong tendency to subordinate each . . . of these
considerations in favor of promoting the substantive interests of one side or the other in
the litigation on the merits." /d.
130. See, e.g., Alpert, Questioning Police Pursuits in Urban Areas, 15 J. PoLICE
Sci. & ADMIN. 298, 299 (1987) (car is a "potentially dangerous weapon"). If police
officers' use of a vehicle to pursue a suspect constitutes a. potentially deadly force, then
one must question whether the fleeing suspect similarly uses potentially deadly force
when he flees. Justice O'Connor, during oral argument in Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593 (1989), questioned whether the person fleeing was "armed with a deadly
weapon in the form of a vehicle." 57 U.S.L.W. 3531, 3532 (Feb. 21, 1989). During a
pursuit, both police officers and a fleeing driver are "armed" with a deadly weapon, the
speeding vehicle. See, e.g., Kuhar v. Hanton, No. 86-4110 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1989)
(Wellford, J., concurring) (when motorcyclist traveled at high speed, he was "armed"
with a deadly weapon). By terminating a pursuit, officer, however, may "disarm" both
themselves and the driver because neither the pursued nor the pursuer will continue to
speed. See infra note 147 and accompanying text for a discussion of how termination of
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a shot fired from a gun: sometimes the individual may die as a result of
the officers' using deadly force and sometimes he is only injured. Regardless of the injuries, the collision involves the use of potentially
deadly force. 131
Although the United States Supreme Court has never detailed
what constitutes the use of deadly force, it has implied that "the
[f]ourth [a]mendment constrains the use of any police practice that is
potentially lethal, no matter how remote the risk. " 132 A pursuit is potentially lethal. Studies document the high risk of physical harm associated with pursuits.m As one scholar has stated, a pursuit is often as
"senseless as shooting at a fugitive on a crowded sidewalk." 13' Another
scholar has similarly emphasized that reckless driving which causes a
person to die should constitute "vehicular murder." 1311 Not all pursuits,
however, result in accidents. 138 Police officers may also use physical
force when they stop an individual by surrounding him. 137 This type of
physical force is sometimes referred to as a "moving roadblock." 138 As

a pursuit causes the fleeing driver to reduce his speed.
131. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the risks associated with police pursuits.
132. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 31, 32 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(under the majority's standard the fourth amendment would require review of "potentially lethal weapons ranging from guns to knives to baseball bats to rope").
133. See supra note 2.
134. A: STONE & S. DELUCA, POLICE ADMINISTRATION: AN INTRODUCTION 416
(1985).
.
135. Luria, Death on the Highway: Reckless Driving as Murder, 67 OR. L. REv.
799, 835-36 (1988).
136. An accident, however, may not be the best means of determining whether a
pursuit was justified because unjustified pursuits do not always conclude with an accident. See Alpert, Questioning Police Pursuits in Urban Areas, 15 J. POLICE Sci. &
ADMIN. 298, 303 (1987).
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Minn. 1990) (officers
"boxed in" the pursued driver with their cruisers and stopped him). In this situation,
the force used by the officers would not produce a physical injury but may produce a
psychological injury. See generally id. at 37 n.10 (psychological injury is actionable if
officers use an "egregious" amount of force). For example, if cruisers surrounded an
individual's car without justification and gradually caused him to stop, the individual
may have suffered a psychological injury. The officers would have restricted the individual's freedom of movement and violated his right to personal security. See generally
Wright v. District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order granting
partial summary judgment) (driver incurred actionable psychological harm because police officers chased her without justification in an unmarked vehicle); Wisniewski v.
Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1990) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (extensive discussion of psychological injuries), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 301 (1990).
138. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RESTRICTIVE POLICIES FOR HIGH-SPEED
PoLICE PuRSUITS, 28 (1989) (pursuit policy of Nassau County, New York, defines
moving roadblocks as the presence of "two or more department cars in front of [a]
pursued vehicle[, which] . . . gradually slow down by allowing no outlet"). Nassau
County states that rolling roadblocks are "most effective on limited access highways."
Id. Police departments disagree as to whether police officers should stop individuals by
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more and more police officers encompass the individual's vehicle, the
police officers use the physical presence of their cruisers to stop the
individual.
2.

Use of Psychological Force

Officers also use psychological force during pursuits. 189 The Suboxing them in. Compare id. at 29-30 (policy of Phoenix, Arizona, prohibits boxing-in
unless the procedure is applied to an "unaware suspect [in order] to avoid pursuit")
with id. at 31-32 (policy of St. Petersburg, Florida, boxing-in is permissible "only if
officer reasonably believes there is substantial risk that violator will cause death or
serious physical injury to others if apprehension is delayed").
139. No courts or criminal justice scholars have ever used the term "psychological force" in discussing police pursuits. I have used this phrase to describe the psychological compulsion that police officers exert when they decide to pursue an individual.
The nature of the interaction between the pursuing police officers and the individual reveals that most pursued drivers respond to the psychological force officers present
during pursuits. This force is apparent by examining how pursued drivers respond during pursuits and how they respond when police officers terminate pursuits. See infra
notes 143-46 and accompanying text. When police officers pursue, the pursued driver's
speed can be in part measured by the speed of the police officers. See infra notes 15253 and accompanying text. As police officers increase their speed in order to apprehend
the driver, the pursued driver increases his speed in order to flee. See id. The pursuit
also communicates to the pursued driver that the officers will continue the pursuit until
the driver stops. This message implicitly compels the driver to continue his flight: by
stopping, the pursued driver will probably be charged with speeding, fleeing from an
officer, and other offenses; by fleeing, he may escape from being charged with any
offense. Once the driver initially refuses to stop and begins his flight, he has little incentive to stop because that initial act of fleeing is the basis for most of the offenses
with which the officers will charge him.
Recently one court implicitly questioned whether psychological force was present
during a police pursuit. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1318 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1989). In Brower, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand, questioned
whether police officers should be allowed to use the danger present in a pursuit as a
reason for justifying a pursuit. ld. By raising this issue, the court may be recognizing
that police officers implicitly create the danger of a pursuit when they decide to pursue.
In other areas, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the use of psychological force by police officers. In determining whether an individual was "seized"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the Court has considered whether officers
stopped an individual by a "show of authority." See infra notes 140-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of psychological force during a "seizure." The
Court has also recognized that psychological compulsion can invalidate a criminal suspect's confession. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (Court
designed the Miranda warnings as a means to dispel psychological pressure inherent
when police officers interrogate an individual in custody); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 53 (1949) (confession is invalid if the product of "sustained pressure" by police,
whether that pressure was physical or mental). The Court has also noted that police
officers can structure a lineup of suspects in a manner that is psychologically suggestive: the structure of the lineup suggests to the observer which individual to select or it
may compel the individual to confess. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 453
(Court recognized coercive nature of a " 'reverse line-up,' " in which the suspect is
placed in a line-up, deliberately charged by "fictitious witnesses" of having committed
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preme Court recognized this type of force in Terry v. Ohio, 140 in which
it discerned that police officers' "show of authority" may cause an individual to stop. 1 " 1 The focus of this definition was whether officers used
psychological force that compelled an individual to stop. 142 In the pursuit context, however, the same actions not only communicate a command to stop, but also that the police will continue to pursue until the
individual stops. Courts, however, have not analyzed the psychological
effect that police officers have on an individual during a pursuit. An
examination of the dynamics of a pursuit reveals the presence of psychological force during all pursuits.
Pursuit experts agree that police officers, when deciding to pursue
an individual, exert psychological force, a force that often compels an
individual to continue his flight until he crashes or the police officers
abandon the pursuit. 148 Expert Van Blaricom states that this psychological force is similar to the psychological force police officers may
sometimes mistakenly apply when responding to domestic violence
problems or hostage crises. 14" In all these situations, the use of psychological force can exacerbate the problem confronting police officers. 1411
The inappropriate use of psychological force can cause an indiyidual to
endanger his life, the lives of others, and the lives of police officers.
Although intervention by law enforcement officials is needed, police officers should anticipate the response that psychological force can
produce. 146
Van Blaricom maintains that if police officers decide to abandon
the pursuit, then the individual will either go home or park his car in
an attempt to evade detection by other police officers. 1" 7 In both situations, the potential harm arising from the pursuit is under the control
of the police officers. By abandoning the pursuit, the psychological

offenses for the purpose of making him confess "to the offense under investigation");
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (reliability is the "linchpin" in determining whether an indentification procedure violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
140. 392 u.s. 1 (1968).
141. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (1968) (a "seizure" occurs when police officers "by
means of physical force or show of authority ... in some way restrain[] the liberty of a
citizen"). See infra notes 362-380 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
"seizure" definition.
142. See infra notes 372-79, 385-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of
psychological force during a "seizure."
143. Interview with D.P. Van Blaricom, Police Expert (July 1989); telephone
interview with Professor Geoffrey P. Alpert, Sociologist and Criminal Justice Scholar
(June I, 1990).
144. Interview with D.P. Van Blaricom, Police Expert (July 1989).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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force compelling the driver to continue the pursuit ceases. 1 " 8
Similarly, criminal justice scholars have recognized that once police officers decide to pursue an individual, there is no reason for the
individual to stop. 149 The individual, who initially responded by fleeing
from officers, probably has committed the offenses of fleeing from an
officer, speeding, and reckless driving.m To continue the pursuit thus
poses no increased criminal or traffic penalty for the individual because
he has already committed the offenses. In those states that have increased the penalty for fleeing from an officer, the pursued driver has
even less incentive to stop the pursuit after it has begun. 1111 Escape thus
may appear to afford freedom from these penalties, but at the risk of
bodily harm to himself and others.
.
Professor Geoffrey Alpert also has affirmed that police officers use
psychological force during a pursuit. He believes that the individual
who flees initiates the pursuit, but that police officers decide whether to
continue the pursuit. 1112 According to Professor Alpert, the speed of the
officers may control the speed of the individual who is fleeing. 1118 This
psychological force arises from the police officers' decision to continue

148. Id.
149. Id. Telephone interview with Professor Geoffrey P. Alpert, Sociologist and
Criminal Justice Scholar (June 1, 1990).
150. See infra notes 262-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
offenses.
151. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.33l(C) (Anderson 1989). Under
Ohio law, fleeing from an officer is a misdemeanor; but it is a felony if a jury makes
one of the following possible factual findings:
(1) in committing the offense, the offender was fleeing immediately after the commis·
sion of a felony;
(2) the operation of the motor vehicle by the offender was a proximate cause of serious
physical harm to persons or property;
(3) the operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk of harm
to persons or property.
Id. Because of the nature of pursuits, under this statute fleeing from an officer would
generally constitute a felony. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the risks associated with pursuits. Although this statute could generally deter individuals from engaging in vehicular flight, once a pursuit has begun, the statute increases the pursued driver's motivation for fleeing. The police officers' presence during
a pursuit could create even more psychological pressure if the pursued driver is aware
of this statute.
152. Telephone interview with Professor Geoffrey P. Alpert, Sociologist and
Criminal Justice Scholar (June 1, 1990).
153~ /d. Professor Alpert has analogized the use of psychological force during a
pursuit to the use of psychological compulsion during a dog race. Id. At a dog race, in
order to make the dogs run faster, a metal frame is placed in front of them with the
appearance of rabbit on it. The dogs' pace increases as the speed of the frame moves
faster. According to Professor Alpert, the police officers' vehicle respresents a similar
kind of compulsion to the pursued driver, except this time the force is behind the
·
driver. Id.
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the pursuit. 1114
Some courts have recognized the presence of psychological force
when police officers in unmarked cars pursue an individual. 11111 These
courts have recognized that the pursued driver's natural response is increased speed. 1118 One court has noted that a pursuing vehicle can "terrorize a civilian." 1117 Another court has found that such psychological
harm arising from an unjustified pursuit is actionable under the fourth
amendment. 1118
Some courts, however, have failed to recognize that pursuits involve psychological force. 1119 These courts have found that only physical
force is actionable under the fourth amendment. 180 In requiring the use
of physical force, these courts focus on the individual's decision to flee,
not the officers' conduct during the pursuit. They have determined that
a pursuit does not involve the use of force because the individual is not
restrained during a pursuit.
This viewpoint, however, is similar to the individualist viewpoint 181
rejected by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner 182 and Brower v.
County of Inyo. 183 In both Garner 184 and Brower/ 811 the Court adopted
a communalist viewpoint 188 by emphasizing the officers' conduct, not
154. ld.
155. See, e.g., Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986); Wright v.
District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order granting plaintiff's
partial summary judgment on issue of fourth amendment violation).
156. See, e.g., Checki, 785 F.2d at 538.
157. ld.
158. Wright v. District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order
granting plaintiff's partial summary judgment on issue of fourth amendment violation).
159. See supra note 63 and infra note 160 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have narrowly viewed the force present during police pursuits.
160. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, (8th Cir. 1989) ("no
evidence that either of the police cars collided with the motorcycle or the innocent
victim"); Brower v. County of lnyo, 817 F.2d 540,_ 546 (9th Cir. 1987) (police officers
did not restrain the plaintiff, even after they set up a roadblock that stopped him),
rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th
Cir. 1986) ("police used absolutely no force" during pursuits); Tagstrom v. Pottebaum,
668 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (pursuit involved no restraint), appeal
denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part,
857 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988). See generally Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d
294, 296 (8th Cir. 1989) (no fourth amendment claim because individual's crashing
into another car was not intended by the police officer's pursuit); Easterling v. City of
Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 921 n.ll (S.D. Ga. 1986) (pursuit may involve the use of
"indirect" force).
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the individualist perspective of responsibility.
162. 471 u.s. 1, 11 (1985).
163. 489 u.s. 593, 598 (1989).
164. 471 U.S. at 11.
165. 489 U.S. at 598-599.
166. See supra notes 43-46, 63-68, 77-90 and accompanying text for a discussion
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the individual's decision to flee when commanded to stop. The Garner
Court declared, "It is not better that all felony suspects die than that
they escape." 167 Instead of determining that the individual had the
choice of preventing the shooting, the Court emphasized the unreasonableness of the officer's decision to shoot. The Brower Court similarly
emphasized· the officers' decision to set up a roadblock that fatally
stopped a pursued driver, rather than emphasizing the individual's failure to terminate his flight prior to crashing into it. 168 It held that the
fourth amendment was implicated even though the individual could
have avoided crashing into the roadblock by simply deciding to stop the
pursuit. 169 The Brower Court rejected the argument that the officers
used no force in stopping the individual. 170 By focusing on the officers'
conduct during a pursuit, one can thus discern the presence of psychological force.
B.

The Act of Pursuing Can Cause an Individual's Injuries

Whether the officers' use of physical force and psychological force
during a pursuit was the proximate cause of injury to a pursued driver,
his passengers, other motorists, or pedestrians depends upon the perspective one adopts. 171 A communalist perspective of pursuit claims focuses on the police officers' conduct during ;:t pursuit; it recognizes that
the officers' use of psychological force may cause harm, even if the purof the communalist perspective of responsibility.
167. 471U.S.at11.
168. 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989). The lower court in Brower, with its individualist viewpoint on what conduct constitutes a fourth amendment "seizure," had implicitly determined that the officers had not used force in setting up the roadblock. Brower
v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, Brower
v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). Although the lower court had erroneously
determined that the police officers had not "seized" the driver when he crashed into the
roadblock, the court nevertheless recognized that the police officers' conduct could violate the fourteenth amendment if a jury determined that it was egregious. /d. at 544,
rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). The lower court emphasized that the
individual had remained free to stop the pursuit that occurred before the officers had
established the roadblock. !d. at 546-47. The court characterized the pursued driver's
options from an individualist perspective by emphasizing his options and by deemphasizing the officers' conduct of establishing the roadblock. The Supreme Court, however, focused on the officers' actions and subjected them to scrutiny under the fourth
amendment.
169. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99. The Court characterized the officers' actions
from a communalist perspective by emphasizing the officers' culpable conduct and
deemphasizing the pursued driver's option of stopping.
170. · !d. The Court determined that the police officers had allegedly caused the
individual to stop. The second question was whether this force caused the individual's
injuries. See infra notes 423-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two
causation issues for pursuit claims.
171. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the harm associated with police
pursuits.
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sued driver's vehicle was the source of injury as it slammed into a tree,
another driver, or pedestrians. As discussed above, both physical and
psychological force create predictable responses by the pursued
driver.m If these responses lead to harm, then under the communalistic perspective, the force causing the harmful response may be the
source causing the injury. An examination of recent Supreme Court
decisions discussing causation under the fourth and fourteenth amendments indicates that the communalist perspective of causation for pursuit claims is appropriate, 178 but that an individualist perspective is appropriate when analyzing officers' failure to pursue a driver. 174 The
difference in perspectives is sound because in acting during a pursuit,
police officers increase the risk of harm to individuals, but in failing to
pursue, any harm that occurs is directly a result of the driver's conduct.
In addition, the communalist perspective of causation in pursuit claims
is harmonious with the Court's decisions subjecting law enforcement
practices, which can seriously infringe upon an individual's right to personal security, to fourth amendment scrutiny. 1711
The Supreme Court has recognized two causation issues for fourth
amendment excessive force claims: 1) what caused an individual to stop
172. See supra notes 126, 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
use of psychological force.
173. See infra notes 214-58 and accompanying text. Some lower courts have also
applied a communalist perspective when police officers' conduct creates or increases the
danger presented to individuals by third parties. See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d
583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989) (because officers allegedly arrested driver, impounded the car,
and left the passenger in an unsafe area at 2:30 a.m., the officer acted with deliberate
indifference to the passenger's need for personal security and may be held liable for
rape committed by a third party), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (officer who allegedly arrested driver and left
children stranded on a highway in a car may be held liable for the harm that occurred
to the children).
174. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
175. In the following cases, the Court found the challenged police practice unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment: Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S.
Ct. 1684, 1688-90 (1990) (overnight guest had a reasonable expectation of privacy of
dwelling; police officers violated privacy by entering dwelling without consent, without
a warrant, or without probable cause and exigent circumstances); Florida v. Wells, 110
S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990) (failure to have a policy concerning the opening of closed
containers during an inventory search violated an individual's expectation of privacy
under the fourth amendment); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-22 (1985) (the use
of deadly force to stop a fleeing felon); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703
(1983) (brief detention of luggage at airport); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-07
(1983) (plurality opinion) (unjustifiable stop of traveler at airport); Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753 (1985) (surgery to remove bullet as evidence); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855 (1969) (fingerprinting at station without
probable cause). The Court has also protected an individual's interest in personal security by declaring that officials violate the fourth amendment if they use excessive
force as they seize an individual, even if the force applied was done in subjective good
faith. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872-73 (1989).
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and 2) what caused an individual's injuries. 178 In resolving the first issue, the Court has adopted a communalistic perspective. The Court has
refused to focus on the individual's act of failing to stop the pursuit and
it has emphasized the police officers' decision, whether it was to shoot a
fleeing suspect 177 or to set up a roadblock. 178 When the suspect died,
what caused the individual to stop was the shooting 179 or the roadblock, 180 not the individual's act of failing to stop when commanded to

176. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989). See infra notes
422-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of these issues.
177. Garner, 4 71 U.S. at 9-11. The Court's characterization of alternatives available to officers strongly reveals its communalist perspective. /d. The Court emphasized
that the "failure to apprehend at the scene does not necessarily mean that the suspect
will never be caught." /d. at 9 n.8. The Court could have emphasized the option available to the suspect, stopping when so commanded. In addition, the Court also expressed
a communalist perspective by emphasizing the inculpatory facts related to the police
officer who shot, not the suspect who fled. /d. at 9-10. The Court characterized the
harm arising from an officer's shooting as grave. /d. The Court stated that even if other
alternatives for capture are generally available to officers, shooting under some circumstances is always unconstitutional even if "subsequent arrest is not likely." Id. at 9 n.8.
The Court could have expressed an individualist perspective by emphasizing the suspect's failure to stop when requested.
178. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. The Court's characterization of the facts reveals
its communalist perspective:
[A] roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to induce a voluntary stop, but it is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur. It may well be that [the officers] here preferred, and indeed earnestly hoped, that [the driver] would stop on his own,
without striking the barrier, but we do not think it practicable to conduct
such an inquiry into subjective intent.
/d. at 598. The Court could have described the facts from an individualist perspective
by emphasizing the driver's option of stopping during the pursuit and before hitting the
roadblock. The Court could have stated that it was the driver's responsibility to make
sure that he was in control of his car at all times. The Court instead focused on the
police officers' conduct and deemphasized the driver's options.
This communalistic perspective is even more apparent when the Court states that
a court should err on the side of protecting an individual from the use of force by police
officers:
In determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement
is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a
line, or we will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been
stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant only
to be bl\ldgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg.
We think it enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.
/d. In focusing on the effect of the police officers' conduct and not the officers' intentions, the Court strongly expressed a communalist perspective. The Court chose not to
emphasize the individual's part in the confrontation between officers and suspects. Instead, it expressed a policy of subjecting the means officers use to inflict personal injury
to constitutional scrutiny.
179. Garner, 411 U.S. at 9.
180. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598.
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do so.
Interpreting both causation issues from the same perspective
would be harmonious with the Court's recent decisions in Brower v.
County of /nyo 181 and Tennessee v. Garner. 182 By broadly interpreting
the first causation issue, the Court subjected the practice of using roadblocks and deadly force to stop 'individuals to scrutiny under the fourth
amendment. 183 To interpret narrowly the causation question, while

181. In Brower, the Court did not address whether the roadblock caused the individual's injuries. Jd. at 599 ("the circumstances of this roadblock, including the allegation that headlights were used to blind the oncoming driver, may yet determine the
outcome of this case").
Recently the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a communalist perspective
as it discussed in detail an analogous causation issue when examining the use of force
by prison officials. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1502-07 (9th Cir. 1990). The court
held that although prison officials had not used excessive force in subduing an unruly
prisoner, they nevertheless could be held liable for the injuries that this force produced,
· because the prisoner's attempted escape was a foreseeable response to their act of trying to put him in the cell of a known violent prisoner. The court emphasized that prison
officials should have foreseen that the prisoner would respond by attempting to flee
when they brought him to the cell. Although the act of fleeing caused the officials to
use force, the intervening act of flight did not relieve the officials from liability. The
court explained, "The courts are quite generally agreed that [foreseeable] intervening
causes ... will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Id. at 1506 (quoting W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 44, at 303-04 (5th ed. 1984)). "Courts
look to the original foreseeable risk that the defendant created." Jd. In this context, a
jury could find that officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's right to personal security. Id.
The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing causation, thus focused on the officials' conduct,
not the individual's rebellious act of fleeing. This decision exemplifies a communalistic
perspective because it emphasizes the prison officials' original act of taking the prisoner
to the cell and deemphasizes the prisoner's responsibility for the harm arising from his
flight. By interpreting the facts of a typical pursuit in this manner, one could hold that
police officers' use of psychological and physical force foreseeably caused an individual
to continue her flight. The intervening act of flight, however, does not necessarily relieve the officers from responsibility for their decision to pursue. The injuries resulting
from a crash, whether the cruiser smashes into the individual's car or the individual
loses control of his vehicle, could thus be caused by the police officers' decision to pursue. The individual's flight response is thus a foreseeable result from the psychological
and physical forces used by police officers. This communalistic perspective thus minimizes the individual's responsibility for his act of fleeing but emphasizes the police
officers' act of pursuing.
182. 471 u.s. 1, 11 (1985).
183. As Justice Scalia noted during oral argument, it would be better to draft a
fourth amendment "seizure" definition that not only would encourage individuals to
stop, but one that would also allow the stopped individual the opportunity to litigate the
issue of whether the particular police practice is "reasonable" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. 57 U.S.L.W. 3531, 3532 (Feb. 21, 1989).
The lower court in Brower, however, would have addressed whether the force used
in establishing the roadblock was disproportionate under the fourteenth amendment.
Brower v. County of lnyo, 817 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds,
489 U.S. 593 (1989). Because the Supreme Court determined that the officers had
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broadly interpreting the "seizure" issue, would be to ignore the Court's
preference of subjecting stops to fourth amendment scrutiny. 184
The Court's recent discussion of causation under the fourteenth
amendment in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services 18"' provides support for the proposition that if police officers
fail to pursue an offender, they cannot be said to have caused the harm
the unapprehended offender later commits. In DeShaney, the Court determined that state social workers did not cause the harm a child experienced when his father beat him. 186 The officials did not cause the
harm because the Court characterized the facts in the case from an
individualist perspective to suggest that the workers had not acted. 187
In its opinion, the DeShaney Court generally described the right to

seized the driver, the protections available under the fourteenth amendment would no
longer be available. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (fourteenth
amendment substantive due process claim not available when the plaintiff alleges that
the force used during a seizure violated the fourth amendment).
184. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485
(1990). In Sitz, the Court expressly limited its holding that police officers without reasonable suspicion may stop drivers at a sobriety checkpoint. !d. The Court stated, "Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require
satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard." !d.
185. 489 u.s. 189 (1989).
186. 489 U.S. at 194-95.
187. In characterizing the facts in this manner, the Court implicitly encouraged
social agencies to continue to attempt to provide services rather than shutting down out
of fear that their services are inadequate and violative of the fourteenth amendment. A
commentator has interpreted the DeShaney opinion as encouraging state legislators to
pass laws that would protect individuals from an official's "reckless omissions." Note,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County: The Narrowing Scope of Constitutional Torts, 49
Mo. L. REv. 484, 508 (1990).
The DeShaney decision does, however, express an individualist perspective. The
Court, for example, narrowly defined the options available to social services workers
and broadly defined the options available to the abused child. 489 U.S. at 203. The
Court stated that if social service workers had taken the child from the father's custody, they "would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the
parent-child relationship." !d. With respect to the child, the Court stated that the
workers had not limited "his freedom to act on his own behalf." !d. at 200. The Court
also characterized the facts in a manner that deemphasized the social service workers
involvement in the difficult family relationship, but emphasized the facts relating to the
abusive father. /d. at 201.
Professor Oren has severely criticized the Court for its individualist perspective.
Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process:
DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C.L. REv. 659, 697 (1990). She equates individualism with
"classical liberalism and the laissez faire ethic." !d. Professor Oren argues that the
Court has misapplied these perspectives because "children ... do not fit the model of
free agents acting in a free market or free society." !d. She also discusses feminist
jurisprudence to indicate that the Court's adoption of individualism in this context represents "male thinking," which focuses attention to abstract objectives, in constrast to
"female thinking," which focuses more attention to relationships in a particular context. !d. at 698.
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personal security by intertwining issues of causation and duty. 188 The
Court was able to intertwine these issues because it is "possible to state
every question which arises in connection with 'proximate cause' in the
form of a single question: was the [official] under a duty to protect the
[individual] against the event which did in fact occur." 189
The DeShaney Court determined that generally there was no duty
to protect an individual against "private violence,'' 190 that is, harm
caused by third parties, as opposed to harm caused by state officials.
The Court noted, however, that even when a third party injures an individual, under some circumstances officials have a duty to protect. 191
A constitutional duty to protect arises only when the state itself deprives an individual of the means to protect himself. 192 A state deprives
an individual of this freedom to protect himself when he is imprisoned,
institutionalized, or subject to "other similar restraint[s] of personal
liberty." 198
188. 489 U.S. at 201. In the following passage, the Court discusses both the
state's limited duty and its lack of involvement in the harm:
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the child] faced
in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything
to render him any more vulnerable to them. That the State once took temporary custody of [the child] does not alter the analysis, for when it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position than
that in which he would have been had it not acted at all; the State does not
become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once
offered him shelter. Under these circumstances, the State had no constitutional duty to protect [the child].
ld. The intertwining of the duty issue with causation was logical in this case because
the Court characterized the facts of the case in a manner to indicate that the state
officials had not acted. With this perspective, the focus of the duty issue was whether
the state was liable for its presumed failure to act.
189. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS,§ 42, at 274-75 (5th ed. 1984).
190. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
191. ld. at 198.
192. ld. at 199-200. The Court stated, "The affirmative duty to protect arises not
from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of
intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed upon his freedom to
act on his own behalf." Id.
193. /d. at 200. Under these circumstances, mere "private violence" has not occurred because state officials are implicated in the harm: they caused the harm to the
individual by breaching their duty to protect her. In drawing the line between state
involvement and mere "private violence," the Supreme Court has sometimes described
the line in terms of a duty and sometimes in terms of causation. In DeShaney, the
predominate focus was on the scope of the constitutional duty to protect; yet, the Court
also used causation language. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. In Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Court used causation analysis to describe an
act as private. 444 U.S. at 284-85 (1980). The Court also used state action analysis to
distinguish private conduct from official conduct. Id. at 285. To use state action analysis as a means to distinguish the two, however, is to invite uncertainty because the
doctrine produces unpredicatable results. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITU-
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The Court's narrow duty definition is understandable if one also
notes that its duty analysis was intertwined with its implicit finding
that the officials also were not the cause of the harm. The Court emphasized that the state officials had not done anything that made the
child "more vulnerable" 194 to the harm caused by his father. It also
noted that the officials had not "created" the danger caused by his father.196 In using these terms, the Court determined that the social service workers had not acted. Thus, according to the Court, there was no
duty to protect because the ·state was not involved in creating the harm
posed by the father. The harm occurred as a result of mere "private
violence." Determining that the harm was a result of private violence,
however, represents the conclusion, not the process of evaluating the
social service workers' actions or inactions.
In characterizing the harmful act as a private one, the DeShaney
Court also relied on Martinez v. California/ 96 a case in which it explicitly used causation analysis in deciding whether state officials were liable for the harm committed by a third party. 197 In Martinez, the Court
determined that parole officials were not liable for the death caused by
the prisoner that they had released. 198 The Court noted that the death
was only remotely linked to the state officials' decision to release the
prisoner and that the officials did not know which individual the parolee would harm. 199

TIONAL LAw § 18-2, at 1691 (2d ed. 1988) (the only way to understand the .Court's
analysis of state action cases is to ask "why anarchy prevails" and "to construct an
'anti-doctrine,' an analytical framework which, in explaining why various cases differ
from one another, [will] paradoxically provide[] a structure for the solution to state
action problems") (emphasis in original). Whichever analysis the Court employs, officials may be liable when their actions or inactions cause a third party to harm an
individual.
194. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
195. /d.
196. 444 u.s. 277 (1980).
197. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 284-85 (1980)).
198. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284-85.
199. The Martinez decision, however, as the Court noted in DeShaney, later be·
came the basis for analyzing the constitutional duty owed by state officials under the
substantive due process clause. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4. Lower courts interpreted Martinez as imposing a duty upon officials to protect an individual from the
harm by a third party if there was a "special relationship" between the officials and the
individual in danger. /d. A "special relationship" existed if officials knew which individual was in danger and if they had offered to protect the individual. /d.
The intertwined nature of duty and causation analysis under the fourteenth
amendment is thus apparent by considering the Court's decision in Martinez and the
lower courts' adoption of a "special relationship" test for determining whether officials
had a constitutional duty. The DeShaney Court, however, limited the doctrine of "special relationships," which emerged after Martinez, to situations in which the state had
deprived the individual of the means to protect herself. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-
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In both DeShaney and Martinez, the Court determined that state
officials had not caused the harm that was committed by a third party.
The Court adopted an individualist perspective on the ultimate issue of
liability. The Court's discussion of causation, however, does not mandate an individualist perspective of the causation issue for a pursuit
claim because during a pursuit, officials are much more closely tied to
the resultant harm than the officials were either to the child abuse or
the murder caused by the parole. In neither DeShaney nor Martinez
did the officials exert physical or psychological force over the third
party that inflicted the harm.
During a pursuit, police officers may use physical force and· psychological force. 200 When police officers intentionally use their cruisers
to collide with the pursued driver, they have used deadly force to stop
the driver. When this crash results in injury to other drivers and
pedestrians, the act of deliberately stopping the pursued driver often
creates a foreseeable risk that others will be injured. In this sense, police officers may have caused the injuries to other drivers and
pedestrians.
When police officers use only psychological force and the pursued
driver harms others, resolving liability depends upon whether one
adopts a communalist perspective or an individualist perspective.
Courts with an individualist perspective on the issue of psychological
force would not find that police officers caused the harm. Because they
do not recognize psychological force, they implicitly determine that the
pursued driver caused his own injuries or the injuries of others. 201
202. To determine the scope of the right to personal security, however, one must also
consider the degree of involvement the state played in creating the danger because the
DeShaney decision also considered whether state actions or inactions had contributed
to the danger posed by the third party. /d. at 196-202. In short, when a third party
causes harm to an individual, whether state officials violated a duty owed to an individual under the fourteenth amendment or caused a violation of the right to personal
security depends upon how one characterizes the state's actions or inactions. If officials
were involved, then the harm may not be a result of "private violence," but instead a
result of the state's breach of its duty to protect. Defining the scope of the fourteenth
amendment thus is generally a question of characterizing the officials' actions or inactions. As stated previously, resolution of causation questions and factual characterizations are generally controlled by policy decisions. The scope of protection available
under the fourteenth amendment thus ultimately is a question of policy. See supra
notes 50, 62-70 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 125-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the force
used during a pursuit.
201. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990); Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 262-63
(8th Cir. 1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986). But see Britt v.
Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp. 189, 191, 195 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (police officer
admitted that when the pursued driver lost control of his vehicle and crashed, the officer "proximately caused" the death of another motorist; court found that police pursuit was reasonable).
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Courts that adopt a communalist perspective on the issue of psychological force have the opportunity to address whether psychological
force caused the injuries that occurred. Under the communalist perspective, one discerns the presence of psychological force and may determine that this force was the proximate cause of the pursued driver's
loss of control. Unlike the state officials in DeShaney, police officers in
pursuing drivers place other drivers and pedestrians in greater danger.
Their actions make other drivers and pedestrians "more vulnerable" 202
to the harm presented by the driver. For example, to pursue a driver
allegedly intoxicated is to increase the speed of a driver already out of
control. A decision not to pursue can lessen the danger presented by an
intoxicated driver.
A decision not to pursue, however, does not subject police officers
to liability because, as the DeShaney Court determined, there is no
general duty to protect the public from harm caused by third parties. 208
A duty only arises if the person harmed was in the custody of the officers. When police officers decide not to pursue, they are not liable for
the harm caused by the unapprehended driver to other motorists and
pedestrians because the injured individuals were not in the custody of
officers. Thus, the DeShaney Court's duty analysis is helpful to the extent that it reveals that police officers would not be liable for a decision
not to pursue.
The DeShaney Court's duty analysis, however, should not be used

202. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200-01.
203. /d. at 200. See generally Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1392
(9th Cir. 1990) (police officers were not liable for their inactions during a hostage crisis
because they "played no part in creating the danger to the victims, nor did they do
anything to render them more vulnerable to [the danger]"); Comment, The Constitutional Duty to Complete a Rescue: An Examination of Archie v. City of Racine, 23
CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 487, 490 (1990) (no constitutional right to protective services, unless "a state initiates rescue").
In Bryson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed an individualist perspective in not imposing liability upon officers for their waiting one hour and a half before
entering a building with hostages. Bryson, 905 F.2d at 1392. The court narrowly described the options available to the officers in a manner similar to the DeShaney Court:
"It is obvious ... that believing there was a hostage situtation inside, had the police
permitted others to rush into the midst of the audible gunfire, there might have been
some basis for charging recklessness or indifference towards the public and possibly
toward those inside." /d. Both the DeShaney Court and Bryson court stated that if the
officials had acted, they may have been sued for their actions. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
203; Bryson, 905 F.2d at 1392.
The Bryson court, however, expressed a communalist perspective in discussing liability if the police officers had acted during the hostage crisis. It recognized that by
entering the building, the officers' mere presence could have exacerbated the situtation.
In this sense, the officers' presence would have signified the presence of psychological
force. See supra notes 126, 139-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of psychological force.
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to ignore the police officers' own actions during a pursuit. 204 As stated
above, police officers use psychological force during a pursuit, a force
that can cause both the pursued driver and the police officer to lose
control and perspective. By focusing on the actions of the police officers, one need not address whether the officers had a duty to protect
other drivers and pedestrians from the harm caused by the pursued
driver because the officers' actions create or increase the harm
presented by a driver.
Even if police officers have caused the injuries incurred by other
drivers and pedestrians, whether using physical or psychological force,
liability attaches only if the force used was disproportionate. To deterPline whether the force used was disproportionate requires consideration of the parties' interests. 205 This latter inquiry is the one in which
courts can best reconcile an individual's right to personal security with
society's interest in law enforcement. 206

IV.

THE DISPROPORTIONALITY STANDARDS OF THE fOURTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

When police officers cause individuals to be injured during pursuits, whether by using physical or psychological force, liability attaches only if the force the officers used was disproportionate to the
need for it. 207 Both the fourth 208 and fourteenth 209 amendments balance
the interests of the parties to determine whether the force was disproportionate. The fourth amendment, however, only applies to individuals
"seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 210 and the four204. See supra notes 171-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of applying a communalist perspective to the actions of police officers and an individualist perspective for their inactions. Although rhetorical devices are implicated when a court
characterizes the facts to determine whether officials acted or failed to act, the difference between action and inaction in the context of police pursuits is not as susceptible
to manipulation. Other issues, such as the presence of force and causation, however, are
subject to opposing characterizations.
205. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of disproportionality under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
206. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of balancing under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
207. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disproportionality standards of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
208. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing of interests for fourth amendment excessive force claims.
209. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing of interests for fourteenth amendment excessive force claims.
210. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (fourth amendment applies to excessive force used "in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other 'seizure' of a free citizen"); see also infra notes 357-459 and accompanying text
for a discussion of when individuals are "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
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teenth amendment applies only when an excessive force claim is not
actionable under the fourth amendment. 211 Because the pursued driver
and her passenger may be "seized" during a pursuit, 212 the fourth
amendment is applicable to them. The fourteenth amendment is applicable to pursuit claims brought by other motorists and pedestrians injured as a result of a pursuit; these individuals are not "seized" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment during a police pursuit. 213 An
examination of the standards under each of these amendments reveals
that most pursuits constitute the use of disproportionate force.
A.

The Fourth Amendment Standard of Disproportiona/ity ·

The fourth amendment protects the right to personal security. It
safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure.in their persons ...
against unreasonable ... seizures." 214 Most pursuits are "unreasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment because they minimally further society's interest in law enforcement while significantly
infringing upon an individual's right to personal security. 216 The unreasonableness or disproportionality of force is apparent by balancing an
individual's interest in personal security against society's interest in law
enforcement. 216 Although the balancing of interests often produces unpredictable results, 217 in the context of pursuits the balance tips in
211. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871. In Graham, the Court recognized
that three constitutional amendments protect an individual's interest in personal security: the fourth amendment applies to individuals "seized" during an investigatory stop,
an arrest, or "other 'seizure' of a free citizen," id.; the eighth amendment applies to
prisoners, id. at 1870; and the fourteenth amendment protects pretrial detainees, id. at
1871 n.lO. The Court stated that either the fourth or eighth amendment will apply in
"most instances" to excessive force claims. Id. at 1870. Many courts have extended the
reach of the fourth amendment to apply to claims that officials used excessive force
after an arrest but before pretrial detention. See supra note 116.
212. See infra notes 380, 402-03, 432-33, 436-39 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how officers may seize the pursued driver and his passengers during a
pursuit.
213. See infra notes 380, 402-03, 434 and accompanying text for a discussion of
.why other motorists and pedestrians are not "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
214. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
215. See infra notes 259-293 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing process under the fourth amendment as applied to pursuits.
216. See infra notes 217-58, 294-349 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the balancing of interests inherent in excessive force claims.
217. See, e.g., Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth
Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1141 n.73 (1984) ("(f]ourth [a]mendment balancing
test operates in almost every new case: Once decided, a particular case need not be
reconsidered, but most cases have distinctive variables calling for a new balance"). See
generally Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 n.18 (7th Cir.) (although balancing
interests generally does not lead to "clearly established" law, officials may be liable
when their "actions are so egregious that the result of the balancing test will be a
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favor of protecting an individual's right to personal security. 218 An examination of the risks and benefits of pursuits indicates that when the
pursued driver or his passengers are injured, the force used may violate
these individuals' fourth amendment right to personal security.
Although the Supreme Court has never determined whether pursuits are unreasonable, in two cases it has articulated the standard for
determining when force is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
In Tennessee v. Garner, 219 the Court established the standard for determining when deadly force is unreasonable, 220 and in Graham v. Connor,221 it determined that the Garner standard also applies to the use of
nondeadly force. 222 An application of the Garner/Graham standard indicates that most pursuits are unreasonable. 223
1.

Tennessee v. Garner Standard

In 1985 the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner 24 articulated a
per se rule for determining when police officers may use deadly force to
apprehend a fleeing suspect. 2211 The rule provided that police officers
may use deadly force only when they have "probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others . . . ." 226 Under the Court's rule, force was thus
automatically disproportionate227 if the officers did not reasonably believe that the suspect presented a significant danger to the commuforegone conclusion"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
218. See infra notes 259-93, 342-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of
balancing the interests of the parties in police pursuits.
219. 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
220. /d. at 11-12; see also infra notes 224-47, 258 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Garner case.
221. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
222. /d. at 1871-72; see also infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Graham case.
223. See infra notes 259-85 and accompanying text for an application of the
Garner/Graham standard applied to police pursuits.
224. 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
225. 471 U.S. at 11.
226. /d.
227. One commentator has characterized the Garner Court as declaring that
force that is disproportionate is unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. Comment, Deadly Force Justifications and the Tennessee v. Garner Proportionality Requirement, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 191, 196 (1986). The author has noted that when police
officers assert that their use of force was "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, they are asserting common "defensive force justifications." /d. He states
that these justifications "follow that same three-pronged theoretical structure": an
event in which the suspect signifies the possibility of harm towards others, a "necessary
response" by police officers, and a response that was "proportional." /d. In Garner, the
Court specified when an event represents harm toward others, when police officers may
respond, and when the use of deadly force is proportionate to the need for it. Garner,
471 U.S. at 11-12.
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nity. 228 The Court created this rule by balancing the interests of the
parties 229 and by rejecting the common law rule, which broadly permitted the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect. 230
The Court determined that the suspect's "fundamental" 231 interest
in personal security outweighed the state's asserted interests. 232 The
state had claimed that the practice of killing all fleeing felons furthered
its interest in effective law enforcement and its interest in reducing
"overall violence." 233 Its interest in law enforcement related to the two
offenses allegedly committed by the fleeing suspect: fleeing from an officer after being commanded to stop and burglary, the original offense
prompting the flight. Although the Court determined that the state's
interests were "important," 234 it closely scrutinized the means the state
had adopted to further these interests. 2811 It found that the· use of

228. Id. The Court's per se rule is a form of "rule utilitarianism." See Note, The
Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127,
1141 n.73 (1984). One scholar has defined "rule utilitarianism" as a form of moral
philosophy that "measures the consequences of different types of actions and lays out
beforehand a set of rules designed to maximize collective pleasure or happiness." !d. In
Garner, the Court established a rule that informs police officers under what circumstances they may shoot a fleeing suspect. 471 U.S. at 11. The Garner decision can be
understood as establishing a rule that courts are to apply before they balance the interests of the parties to determine whether the force used was disproportionate to the need
for it. If officers did not reasonably believe that the suspect presented a danger to the
community, then the shooting signifies the use of disproportionate force under the per
se rule and balancing would not be necessary. One scholar has advocated this approach
to fourth amendment issues because balancing alone, without any per se rules, fails to
protect an individual's interest in personal security. See Note, supra note 228, at 1127.
In contrast to rule utilitarianism is "act utilitarianism," which "determines the morality of an act by weighing all of its consequences" and considers "the best actions [to
be] those that increase the aggregate pleasure or happiness of an entire society." /d. at
1141 n.72. When the Garner Court first balanced the interests of the parties, it appeared to express the moral philosophy of "act utilitarianism" to create its per se rule.
The Court explained that " 'the balancing of interests' " is the "'key principle of the
Fourth Amendment.'" Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 700 n.l2 ( 1981) ).
229. /d. at 9-12.
230. /d. at 13-15.
231. /d. at 9.
232. Id. at 9-10.
233. Id. at 9.
234. Id. at 10.
235. Id. at 10. The Court stated, "we are not convinced that the use of deadly
force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to jusitify the killing of
nonviolent suspects." /d.
Recently the Court expressed some reluctance in evaluating the effectiveness of
the means chosen by law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990). In Sitz, the Court allowed officials to
establish sobriety roadblocks as a means designed to protect the public from experiencing physical harm caused by an intoxicated driver and noted the following:
Experts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of
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deadly force to stop all fleeing felons, and in this case, the burglary
suspect, was not sufficiently tailored to the state's interests in law enforcement.1186 In short, the use of force was disproportionate to the need
for it, even if the suspect would not have been arrested later. 1187
Although the state had an interest in arresting suspects for the act
of fleeing, the degree of force permitted under the statute1188 did not
relate to the seriousness of the offense committed.:0189 Because some
states did not outlaw fleeing from an arrest, some made flight only a
misdemeanor, and some imposed only a fine for the act of fleeing, 1140 the
offense of fleeing itself was not a serious offense that justified the use of
deadly force. 1141 Presumably the state's interest in apprehension is directly related to the seriousness of the offense allegedly committed. The
state's interest in apprehension for the act of flight was thus not substantial. Furthermore, its interest in apprehending a burglary suspect
was similarly outweighed by the suspect's fundamental interest in personal security because, as the Court determined, the suspect had not
committed a serious offense.
Deadly force, however, would properly further the state's interest
in law enforcement if the attempt to capture related to a serious offense. The Court defined a serious offense as one in which the suspect

apprehending drunken drivers is preferrable as an ideal. But for purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of,
and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number
of police officers.
ld. When the use of force is in issue, the Supreme Court has not expressed this deference. In Garner, the Court did not defer to legislatures the task of determining how
best to balance the interests of the parties. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Law - The
Right to Run: Deadly Force and the Fleeing Felon: Tennessee v. Garner, 11 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 171, 183 (1986) (Garner Court failed to discern that "legislatures are best able
to evaluate all the information and public opinion and come to a proper balancing of
public and private interests"); see also Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
119, 148 (1989) (even though the "Rehnquist Court, like the Burger Court before it,
has generally been inhospitable toward ... substantive fourth amendment claims," it
nevertheless has evaluated closely fourth amendment claims raising the issue of the
reasonableness of force). The Court has frequently subjected police practices to fourth
amendment scrutiny. See supra note 175.
236. Garner, 471 U.S. at 10.
237. Id. at 9 n.8. ("we proceed on the assumption that subsequent arrest is not
likely").
238. TENN. CooE ANN. § 40-7-108 ( 1982) ("If, after notice of intention to arrest
the defendant, he either fiee[s] or forcibly resist[s), the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.").
239. Garner, 471 U.S. at 1L
240. Id. at 10 n.9. The Court aptly noted that the decedent in Garner could have
received a fine of fifty dollars for his act of fleeing if the officer had not killed him. Id.
241. Id. at 11.
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"poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others .... " 242 Under this definition, not all felonies would constitute
serious offenses. Instead, seriousness is directly related to the harm the ,
individual presents to the community if he is not apprehended. Thus, if
the offense prompting the flight was one that involved "the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm," 243 then using deadly
force to apprehend the suspect would be reasonable. Using deadly force
under these circumstances would further the state's interest in apprehending a dangerous suspect.
This per se rule for the use of deadly force strikes the appropriate
balance between the state's interest in law enforcement and the individual's interest in personal security. The Court recognized that an individual has a fundamental interest in life. 244 When an individual commits a serious offense, however, the state's interest in law enforcement
outweighs the individual's fundamental interest. The use of deadly
force under these circumstances is reasonable because it allows police
officers to protect others whose lives are threatened by the suspect's
freedom.
· By balancing the interests in this manner, the Court created a per
se rule that conflicted with the common law rule, which allowed officers
to shoot all fleeing felons. In rejecting the historical context of the
fourth amendment, the Court explained that changes in law and in
technology indicated that the practice of shooting all fleeing felons was
unreasonable. 2411
In its analysis of what constitutes the use of disproportionate force,
242. /d. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that all felonies are serious
and all misdeameanors are not serious. /d. at 14. The Court thought the actual danger
posed by the suspect was a better measure of the seriousness of the crime. /d. at 20.
In the context of determining what constitutes exigent circumstances under the
fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has measured the gravity of the offense by
considering the penalty that a state imposes for a particular offense. See, e.g., Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). The Court determined that the offense of driving
while intoxicated was not serious because the state "has chosen to classify the ...
offense ... as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible." /d. at 754. The dissent, however, appropriately criticized the Court for failing to
recognize that the civil classification of this offense was meant to aid the state in securing convictions for the traffic offense. /d. at 763 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent
thus maintained that the offense was a serious one, rather than a minor offense. /d. at
762-63 (White, J., dissenting).
243. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
244. !d. at 9.
245. /d. at 13. The Court interpreted the standard of disproportionality under
the fourth amendment in' light of technological changes, not the common law rule. In
doing so, the Court implicitly recognized that reliance on the common law rule would
have failed to consider societal values. See Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Derner
cratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 700 (1986) ("history was uninstructive; at worst, its application would have led to a quite arbitrary
rule").
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the Garner Court thus appeared to express a communalist perspective
because it emphasized the police officer's role in the shooting and
deemphasized the suspect's culpable act of fleeing and committing burglary. The Court also emphasized the options available to police officers
and deemphasized the suspect's options. It stressed "that failure to ap~
prebend at the scene does not necessarily mean that the suspect will
never be caught." 2" 6 On the other hand, the Court deemphasized the
notion that the suspect could have prevented the need for force by complying with the officer's command. Using strong communalist tones, the
Court stated, "It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they
escape." 247
The Court thus strongly protected a suspect's right to personal security under the fourth amendment by closely evaluating the means
officers use to apprehend suspects. The fourth amendment safeguards a
suspect's right to personal security as long as that right does not infringe upon another individual's right to personal security. Only when
the suspect poses a danger to others is the suspect's right to personal
security less weighty. The Court similarly expressed the importance of
the right to personal security in the recent decision of Graham v.
Connor. 2 " 8
2.

Graham v. Connor Standard

Four years after the Garner decision, the Supreme Court clarified
in Graham v. Connor" 9 that the Garner standard was also applicable
to claims involving the use of nondeadly force. Again, the Court focused on the seriousness of the offense that the individual had committed and considered the risk that an individual who evades arrest poses
to others. 211° For force to be reasonable under the fourth amendment, it
must be related to the need to apprehend or control an individual. 2111
In applying the Garner standard to a claim alleging the use of
nondeadly force, the Court made explicit what was implicit in Garner.
It articulated three factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of force: "[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the
246. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9 n.8.
247. /d. at 11. Professor Geoffrey Alpert interprets Garner as establishing a
"moral precedent." G. ALPERT, THE POLICE UsE OF DEADLY FORCE: GuNs, VEHICLES
AND OTHER WEAPONS (1991) (forthcoming). He criticizes the Garner Court as providing "no more than rhetoric and ambiguity ... [to] serve as guideposts for a post-hoc
analysis." /d.; see also Winter, supra note 245 at 692 (Garner decision "is essentially a
moral pronouncement").
248. 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871-72 (1989); see infra notes 249-58 and accompanying
text.
249. /d. at 1871-72.
250. /d.
251. /d.
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suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by fiight." 2112 All three factors compel police officers to measure
the need for force in light of the danger posed by the suspect, with the
danger being measured by the seriousness of the alleged offense and the
risk of harm in not capturing the suspect.
The first factor is similar to the Court's focus in Garner on the
offense allegedly committed by a suspect. If the offense is a serious
offense, then more force would be permissible in apprehending or controlling a suspect than if the offense were minor. The second factor is
also present in the Garner decision. Both question the danger that the
suspect poses to others. In Graham, however, the Court questioned
whether the suspect posed an "immediate" threat to others. 2118 If the
individual would not endanger others, then less force is permissible
than if the suspect presented imminent harm. Similarly, the last factor
questions whether the suspect is attempting to escape. When this factor
is read in light of the other two factors in the Garner decision, the
degree of force reasonable under the fourth amendment relates to the
offense that the individual committed and the harm that he presents to
others if he remains at large. The last factor thus does not authorize
police officers to use an unlimited amount of nondeadly force to apprehend a suspect. Force must be proportionate to the offense, the danger
the suspect poses to others, and the suspect's resistance to arrest. 2114
Force is thus reasonable if it is proportionate to the need for it.
Reasonableness of force, according to the Court, is to be measured objectively, not subjectively. 21111 Even if police officers in good faith applied
force in arresting an individual, the force used may not be reasonable.2116 Reasonableness is to be determined by considering whether a
reasonable officer would have similarly thought the degree of force actually used was reasonable under the circumstances known to the acting police officer. 2117
The Graham standard, like the Garner standard, represents a communalist perspective regarding the use of nondeadly force. The Graham Court deemphasized a suspect's culpable conduct in failing to
comply with the officers' attempt to subdue him, while it emphasized
the police officers' role during the altercation. By determining that a

252. ld. at 1872.
253. ld.
254. ld.
255. ld. at 1872-73. The Court properly noted, however, that although a plaintiff
need not establish that officers maliciously used force to establish a fourth amendment
claim, the plaintiff may nevertheless inject into the case the officers' subjective bad
faith when he seeks to attack their credibility. ld. at 1873 n.12.
256. ld. at 1872.
257. ld.
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suspect need not prove that officers acted maliciously in subduing him,
the Graham Court subjected the force officers use to greater scrutiny
than if it had adopted a good faith standard. As it related the use of
force to the seriousness of the offense and the "immediate" risk the
suspect presents to others, the Graham Court implicitly determined
that it is not better that all suspects be subjected to force "than that
they escape." 2&8
The Garner/Graham standard broadly protects an individual's
right to personal security. Although the Court has never applied this
standard to pursuits, an application of the Garner/Graham standard
indicates the unreasonableness of most pursuits.
3.

Applying the Garner/Graham Standard to Pursuits

The Garner/Graham standard applies to the use of force by police
officers, whether deadly or nondeadly. 2118 In the context of pursuits, police officers often use either physical force 280 to stop an individual,
which constitutes the use of deadly force, or psychological force, 281
which constitutes the use of potentially deadly force. To determine the
reasonableness of pursuits, one must consider the factors specified in
the Garner/Graham standard. These factors are helpful in balancing
the interests of the parties and provide a means of evaluating whether
the force applied during a pursuit is disproportionate to the need for it.
The first factor, the seriousness of the offense, compels police officers to evaluate the offenses allegedly committed by a suspect who
flees. The typical pursuit often involves a violation of three laws: the
original offense prompting the officers to attempt a stop, flight from an
officer, and speeding. In most situations, the original offense is a traffic
violation. 282 For example, police officers have chased individuals for not
.258. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; see also supra note 247 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 260-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Garner/Graham standard.
260. See supra notes 125, 128-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
police officers use physical force during pursuits.
261. See supra notes 127, 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
police officers use psychological force during pursuits.
262. One state attorney has stated that although the purported reason for pursuing an individual is a violation of a traffic law, the "offense that precipitated the chase
was 'contempt of cop' - that is, the officer's ego says, 'I won't let him outrun me.'"
Emory Plitt, an assistant Maryland Attorney General, made the comment during a
conference for chiefs of police, International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference Report, 44 CRIM. L. REP. 2136 (1988). Studies, however, indicate that young male
police officers are more likely to display this attitude than young female officers or
more experienced officers. See supra note 88. Similarly, even when pursuits do not end
because of a collision, officers often use excessive force even after the individual's vehicle has stopped. /d. The affront to police authority during a pursuit is real, yet the
Court in both Garner and Graham admonished officers to use force only in relation to
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wearing a helmet, 268 for squealing tires, 264 for having the wrong license
plates on the vehicle, 26G for having no licenses plates, 266 for failing to
have headlights on, and for not stopping at a stop sign267 or a red
light. 268 Whether these offenses are serious is to be ascertained by considering the second factor, the risk that these offenses pose to other
individuals, because the Garner/Graham standard explicitly rejected
classifying seriousness on a basis of whether the suspect had committed
a felony or a misdemeanor. 269
The first and second factors both require consideration of the harm
inherent in violating a law. The second factor, however, focuses on the
immediacy of harm that the suspect presents to others. An application
of these factors indicates that the degree of harm presented by traffic
offenses varies depending upon the offense. For example, the failure to
wear a helmet may present a risk of harm to the driver, but not to
others near him. The failure to stop at a stop sign or a red light may
present an immediate risk to others if one assumes ~hat the driver generally fails to stop when he should, rather than assuming that this was
an isolated incident. 270 Similarly, failing to use headlights can poten-

the seriousness of the crime. Graham, 109 S. Ct at 1872; Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
263. Webbs v. Hyans, No. 88-3180 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, Federal
library, Court of Appeals file). Under a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, police officers might be able to pursue individuals for failing to wear a
seatbelt. The court held that police officers have the authority to stop drivers who do
not appear to be wearing a seatbelt. Guerrero v. United States, 58 U.S.L.W. 3646
(lOth Cir. April, 10, 1990) (court approves stop of vehicle because the driver, who was
wearing a lap belt, did not appear to be wearing a seatbelt).
264. Reed v. County of Allegan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 n.4 (W.O. Mich.
1988).
265. Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 295 (8th Cir. 1989).
266. Webbs v. Hyans, No. 88-3180 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, Federal
library, Court of Appeals file).
267. Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (N.D. Iowa 1987), appeal
denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 857 F.2d
502 (8th Cir. 1988).
268. City of Amarillo v. Langley, 651 S.W.2d 906, 911 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
269. Professor Salken has noted that "[t]raffic offenses, even the most serious,
are almost always enforced by fines." Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic
Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 221, 268 (1989). She questioned whether the penalty is
inconsistent with the broad arrest powers that states have given police officers during
stops for traffic violations. /d. at 262. The power to arrest for traffic offenses is "relatively recent ... it is not justified nor foreshadowed by common law practice." Id. at
259. Professor 'Salken argued that the only traffic offense warranting the arrest power
is driving while intoxicated. /d. at 271.
270. See generally id. at 270 (some states limit a police officer's power to arrest
for a traffic violation to situations in which " 'there is a reasonable likelihood that the
offense would continue or resume or that persons or property would be endangered by
the arrested person.") (quoting TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-7-118(c)(2) (Supp. 1988)).
One commentator has criticized the Garner Court for allowing police officers to
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tially place others at risk, but the failure to have the proper license
plate does not place other lives in danger; instead, the focus of the stop
is probably to apprehend someone who has committed a property
crime. 271 Police officers, however, have pursued individuals for traffic
offenses that endanger others in a more obvious manner. For example,
police officers have pursued individuals for speeding, 272 for drag racing,278 and for generally driving in an "unsafe manner." 274 Because
these latter traffic offenses may endanger the lives of others, they are
serious offenses.
The second and third offenses common to pursuits, flight and
speeding, can also endanger the lives of others. The harm presented by
these offenses is "immediate." Studies well document the risk of harm
that pursuits engender, not only to the individual, but also to police
officers, other drivers, and pedestrians. 2711 These too are serious offenses.
The threat posed by the second and third offenses, however, arises
from the police officers' decision to pursue, rather than from the individual's initial flight. 276 By terminating the pursuit, police officers may
cause the individual to stop his flight and speeding. 277 In this situation,
the suspect does not pose an "immediate threat" to others; instead, the

use deadly force to apprehend a suspect who has allegedly committed a serious offense,
without considering whether "the suspect might not pose any threat of harm to the
officer or others." Comment, Criminal Procedure- Search and Seizure - Law Officer's Use of Deadly Force Against Nondangerous Fleeing Felon Held Violative of
Fourth Amendment, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 758, 779 (1987). Implicit in the Garner
decision, however, is the assumption that someone who has allegedly committed an
offense "involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm" is a
dangerous person, one that continues to present a significant risk of harm to police
officers and others until he is apprehended. Garner, 471 U.S. at II.
271. See, e.g.. Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (stealing a
car); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't., 721 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D. Ark. 1989)
(same); City of Miami v. Harris, 490 Sc. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(burglary).
Some police policies allow pursuits to apprehend someone who has allegedly violated another person's interest in property. See, e.g., City of Overland Park, Kan., High
Speed Motor Vehicle Pursuit (April 13, 1989) ("primary goal of the department is the
protection of life and property"); Macon, Ga., Police Department General Order: Police Vehicle Operations (Jan. 1, 1988) (same).
272. Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 262 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 201 (6th Cir. 1986); Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205,
1207 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 776 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1985); Easterling v. City
of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 913 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
273. Allen v. Cook, 668 F. Supp. 1460, 1461 (W.O. Okla. 1987).
274. Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987).
275. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the risks associated with police pursuits.
276. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of how officers' use of psychological force during pursuits can cause the pursued driver to continue to flee and to increase his speed.
277. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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police pose such a threat by continuing the pursuit. Similarly, police
officers, by continuing to pursue, may increase the danger presented by
the initial offense. The psychological force used during a pursuit may
increase the danger presented by an unsafe driver. 278 Pursuing an individual is like shooting at an individual's vehicle279- both raise his adrenalin and increase his speed.
The final factor, whether the individual resists arrest, is applicable
to all pursuits. This factor focuses on the force the suspect used in attempting to flee. When combined with the other two factors, it does not
permit the use of all force to apprehend an individual. The police officers' use of force must still be proportionate to the need for it.
Applying these factors to the typical pursuit reveals that even
when the original traffic offense presents a risk of harm to others, pursuit is unjustified because the use of psychological force increases the
risk of harm. The common second and third offenses, flight and speeding, also do not justify a pursuit. Although there is a risk of harm to
others that arises from the act of fleeing and speeding, police officers
can terminate the danger to others by terminating the pursuit. Only a
quick termination will lessen the danger to others because injuries occur as frequently in pursuits lasting a minute as they do in pursuits
lasting longer than a minute. 280 By not pursuing individuals for traffic
offenses, police officers thus do not increase the risk of harm nor do
they create an unnecessary risk.
Application of the Garner/Graham standard indicates that pursuit
is generally a means that unduly infringes upon an individual's interest
in personal security. Striking the balance in this manner, however, does
not ignore the state's important interest in law enforcement. It only
signifies that the state may adopt other means that are "reasonable,"
which is to be ascertained by considering the degree of infringement
upon an individual's right to personal security. As the Garner Court
stated, technological advances are important in determining whether a
particular law enforcement practice is reasonable. 281 The use of helicopters, small airplanes, or spike belts would allow officers to continue
pursuit without unduly infringing upon the right to personal security. 282
The Supreme Court recently stated that it would not subject a law en-

278. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dangers associated with psychological force.
279. See generally, Veach v. Cross, 532 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
("the only significance of the alleged shooting was that it may have spurred the fleeing
driver to drive even faster").
280. See supra note 1.
281. Garner, 411 U.S. at 13.
282. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternatives to vehicular pursuits.
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forcement practice to close scrutiny283 nor tell agencies how to allocate
resources. 284 However, the particular program at issue, the use of roadblocks to determine whether a driver is intoxicated, significantly furthered the right to personal security by attempting to reduce the number of intoxicated drivers on the road. 2811 This program used a stop to
prevent harm to the driver and others on the road; it did not exacerbate
the risk of harm as pursuits do.
Many pursuit policies used by law enforcement agencies, however,
violate the fourth amendment because they fail to recognize the risk of
harm present in all pursuits. 288 These unconstitutional policies expose
these agencies to costly law suits under section 1983 287 brought by indi-

283. Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990). Although the Court rejected the lower court's "searching examination of 'effectiveness,'"
it nevertheless did scrutinize the means by considering whether the law enforcment
practice reasonably advanced the state's interest. Id. at 2487-88. The Court's statement
in Sitz should not be read to state that the Court will apply only a rational level of
review in evaluating the soundness of a law enforcement practice. The Court has frequently subjected means to close scrutiny. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct.
1684, 1688 (1990) (officers may not enter dwelling to search for "overnight guest"
unless they have either a warrant or consent); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1099
(1990) (protective sweep of dwelling "may extend only to a cursory inspection of those
spaces where a person may be found" and must last no longer than "necessary to dispel
the reasonable suspicion of danger"); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (use
of deadly force to stop all fleeing felons is unreasonable); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 767 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (surgery to remove a bullet would be
unreasonable).
284. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487 ("governmental officials ... have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number
of police officers").
285. /d. at 2488.
286. Some pursuit policies fail to stress the importance of considering the seriousness of the offense allegedly committed by the driver. See, e.g., City of Overland
Park, Kan., High Speed Motor Vehicle Pursuit (April 13, 1990) ("Pursuits for person(s) suspected of involvement in serious crime are viewed as more justifiable than
those for persons suspected of only traffic or other misdemeanor violations"); City of
West Palm Beach, Vehicle Pursuits (Apr. 7, 1989) (although policy expresses concern
about the danger pursuits represent, it states "that it is not in the best interests of
public safety to advocate a policy that would encourage the ... car thief, or fleeing
criminal to proceed without imminent possibility of police intervention"). Some pursuit
policies also allow unmarked police vehicles to pursue individuals, a policy that places
unwarned motorists in danger. See, e.g., Macon Police Department, Georgia, Police
Vehicle Operations (Apr. 1, 1988) ("Unmarked police vehicles may engage in hot pursuit only when the fleeing vehicle presents an immediate and direct threat to life or
property"); see also City of Jackson, Tennessee, General Order: Pursuit Procedures
(Mar. 22, 1989). Some policies allow officers to pursue intoxicated drivers, even though
pursuit increases the risk of harm to the public. See, e.g., Montana Highway Patrol,
Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy (Mar. 1990) (the need to apprehend a driver "under the
influence of alcohol or drugs" outweighs the risk of harm presented by a pursuit).
287. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). In Harris,
the Supreme Court recognized that a local government may be liable for the harm
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viduals "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the pursued driver and any passengers in the pursued vehicle who were
injured. 288
A pursuit may also violate the substantive due process component
of the fourteenth amendment. 289 Individuals not "seized" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment may assert claims under the fourteenth amendment. 290 Such individuals include other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians injured as a result of a pursuit. 291 Similarly, the
pursued driver and her passengers may assert a fourteenth amendment
claim in the alternative as a means of preserving scrutiny of the pursuit
if a court rejects their argument that they were "seized" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 292 In the context of a pursuit, protection available under the fourteenth amendment is similar to the protection under the fourth amendment. Both amendments balance the interests of the parties to determine whether force was disproportionate
to the need for it. 293

inflicted by officials if the harm was caused by deliberate indifference in training officials. ld. at 388. See generally Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official
Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 625, 630 (1989) (author criticizes
the Court's decision in Harris and suggests that local government liability should depend upon "whether the [municipal] agent was at fault and whether the agent was
'caused' by the city to commit the violation") (emphasis in original). The Court expressly stated that if a local government fails to train its officers regarding the proper
use of deadly force, the "failure to do so could properly be characterized as 'deliberate
indifference' to constitutional rights." Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. The Court stated
that the need to train officers in deadly force is "obvious." Id.
The Harris standard applies, however, not only to training but also to supervision.
See, e.g., Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989); S. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 STATE COURT LITIGATION, §15.2(a), at 15-4 n.l7 (1988). But
see Brown, Accountability in Government and Section 1983 (forthcoming) (courts
should impose liability upon supervisors when they are negligent in their duties).
288. See infra notes 380, 403, 432-33, 436-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of how police officers may "seize" the pursued driver and his passengers during
a pursuit.
289. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of excessive
force claims under the fourteenth amendment.
290. See, e.g., Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't., 721 F. Supp. 189, 190-93 (E.D.
Ark. 1989) (other motorist killed when police officers pursued car thief).
291. See infra notes 380, 403, 434 and accompanying text for a discussion of
why these individuals are generally not "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment during police pursuits.
292. See, e.g., Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203-05 (6th Cir. 1986) (pursued
driver was not "seized"; court also considered whether the pursuit violated the fourteenth amendment). See generally Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986)
(injured passenger in pursued vehicle stated a violation of substantive due process).
293. See supra notes 214-292 and infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the balancing interests under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.
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The Disproportionality Standard of the Fourteenth Amendment

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life [or] liberty ..
. without due process of law." 294 The substantive due process component of this amendment protects a person's right to personal security. 2911
This amendment safeguards an individual's right to personal security
only when the right is not protected either by the fourth amendment, 296
which protects against unreasonable seizures, or the eighth amendment,
which protects against "wanton and unnecessary" force. 297 Because
neither the fourth amendment 298 nor the eighth amendment 299 apply to
claims asserted by other drivers, their passengers, or pedestrians who
are injured during a pursuit, 800 the fourteenth amendment is applicable
to these claims. The scope of the right to security under the fourteenth
amendment, however, is similar to the scope of the right to personal
security under the fourth amendment. 801
In contrast to personal security claims brought under the fourth
amendment802 and the eighth amendment, 808 the Supreme Court has
294. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
295. See supra note 7.
296. See, e.g.• Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989).
297. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. (prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments"); see
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("'unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment'") (quoting Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977), which quoted Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
298. The fourth amendment is not applicable because these individuals are not
"seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See infra notes 380, 403, 434
and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
299. The eighth amendment is not applicable because these individuals are not
prisoners. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40.
300. If a court determines that a pursued driver and passsengers were not seized
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, then it may need to address the alternative ground of substantive due process. See, e.g.. Galas 801 F.2d at 202-05; Tagstrom,
668 F. Supp. at 1271-73.
301. See supra note 214-300 and infra notes 302-353 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the disproportionality standards under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.
302. See supra notes 224-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors applicable to fourth amendment excessive force claims.
303. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. In Whitley, the Supreme Court stated
that during a prison riot, only the malicious use of force violates the eighth amendment. Id. In deciding whether force was malicious, the Court applied three factors that
courts have considered in determining whether force violated the fourteenth amendment: the need for the force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force, and the extent of the injury inflicted. Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
When the exigency of a prison riot is not present, some courts have applied the same
factors to determine whether the force used signified "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's right to personal security. See, e.g.. Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343, 1350 (8th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 542 (1989) (deliberate indifference is actionable
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not articulated factors for determining when force violates the substantive due process component of 'the fourteenth amendment. It has, however, generally described the right to substantive due process, 304 and
lower courts have specified factors to aid them in determining whether
force violated the fourteenth amendment. 3011 An examination of these
cases indicates that officials are liable when they use an egregious
amount of force, force that is disproportionate to the need for it.
1.

The Rochin/Glick Standard

When the Supreme Court in 1952 held in Rochin v. Ca/ifornia 806
that conduct which "shocks the conscience" violates the substantive
due process component of the fourteenth amendment, the Court generally described the right to personal security. 307 In Rochin, police ofbecause force "occurred after any threat to institutional security had been quelled");
Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 135-36 (1st Cir. 1988) (summary judgment not
possible because factual dispute as to whether there was a prison disturbance where
institutional safety was at stake; if no such disturbance exists, deliberate indifference is
the standard).
304. See infra notes 306-09 and acCompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of excessive force claims under the fourteenth
amendment.
305. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors courts have applied to excessive force claims under the fourteenth amendment.
306. 342 u.s. 165 (1952).
307. Id. at 172. In determining that the conduct under consideration "shock[ed]
the conscience," the Court used its own institutional conscience to determine the lawfulness of the conduct. The Court appeared, however, to rely on social norms to determine what constituted egregious conduct. It stated that the due process clause protects
those interests that are " 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.'" /d. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)). This process was similar to the procedure the Court frequently used to
determine whether a right contained in the Bill of Rights was fundamental and was
incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., id.
(whether the conduct "'offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express
the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous offenses'") (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17
(1945)). A right protected by the substantive due process component of the fourteenth
amendment is thus a right in essence created by the judiciary.
The right to personal security is an aspect of the right protected by the substantive
due process component. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.lO (substantive due
process component protects pretrial detainees from the use of excessive force). See generally Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common Law Torts: A Critque and a
Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 515, 517 (1989) (author
distinguishes between incorporated substantive due process, "fundamental rights" substantive due process (e.g., the right to privacy), and "shocks the conscience" substan·
tive due process). One court has stated that "shocks the conscience" substantive due
process is workable only in the context of excessive force claims. See Braley v. City of
Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1990) (excessive force claims represent the only
"area in which the consciences of judges are shocked with some degree of uniformity").
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fleers used force in compelling an individual to swallow an emetic in
order to make the individual regurgitate incriminating evidence. 808 The
Court determined that this conduct violated the individual's right to
personal security; the government's need for incriminating evidence did
not outweigh the individual's interest in bodily integrity. 809
This decision, however, provided little guidance in determining
when an official's use of force was sufficiently egregious so as to constitute a constitutional violation. Two decades later, Judge Friendly of the
Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick 810 articulated factors to aid courts
in determining when force violated an individual's constitutional right
to personal security. 311 He stated that courts should consider the following four factors:
[ 1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] the extent of injury inflicted, and [4] whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.m

These factors require courts to balance an individual's interest in bodily
integrity against the government's need for force.
In discussing these interests, the Supreme Court in 1986 recognized in Daniels v. Williams 318 and Davidson v. Cannon 814 that negligent conduct does not implicate the substantive due process component
of the fourteenth amendment. 8111 It stated that the fourteenth amendment protects only against the "affirmative abuse of power" 818 and that
"[h]istorically, [the] guarantee of due process has been applied to de308. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
309. /d. at 171-74 (Court considered society's interests, which "push[] in opposite directions").
310. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414
u.s. 1033 (1973).
311. /d. at 1033.
312. /d. The lower courts, however, have not uniformly interpreted the factors;
not all courts have required malicious conduct nor a serious injury in order to find a
violation of substantive due process. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
313. 474 u.s. 327 (1986).
314. 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
315. Daniels, 414 U.S. at 332-33; Davidson, 414 U.S. at 347.
316. Daniels, 414 U.S. at 331 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring)). In the context of excessive force claims, the Court's
requirement of an affirmative act is not problematic because the use of force constitutes
an act. Characterizing officials' responses to a situation as either action or inaction,
however, is problematic for other substantive due process claims. Compare DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989) (majority opinion held that because there was no duty to act officials were not liable for their inaction) with id. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion characterized actions
of officials as creating a duty to protect child from abusive father). See supra notes
185-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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liberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life [or]
liberty." 317 In light of the Court's egregious standard in Rochin and the
lower courts' application of the Glick factors to excessive force claims,
the Court's rejection of negligence as a basis was not surprising. Of
much greater interest was the Court's statement that it left for another
day whether gross negligence or recklessness violates the fourteenth
amendment. 818
Since the Court left this question open, the lower courts have disagreed as to whether gross negligence or recklessness is actionable
under the fourteenth amendment. 819 Some have stated that gross negligence is sufficient, 320 some have stated that recklessness is necessary, 821
and some have stated that only intentional conduct is actionable. 322 Regardless of the particular state of mind selected, determining the scope
of the right to personal security under the fourteenth amendment. has
required courts to balance the interests of the parties. 828 This balancing

317. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (emphasis in original).
318. Id. at 334 n.3. The Court properly recognized that the distinctions between
negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and intention may not be clear. Id. at 335. It
refused, however, to "trivialize the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause in an effort to simplify
constitutional litigation." Id. The question of whether gross negligence or recklessness
is actionable not only depends on how a court interprets the state-of-mind requirement
for substantive due process claims, but also on how a court describes the particular
standard that it adopts and how it characterizes facts in a case. See, e.g., Germany v.
Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 n.10 (1st Cir. 1989) (court declared that recklessness is actionable under the fourteenth amendment, but its definition of reckless conduct is similar to
the deqnition for intentional conduct: "official believes [or reasonably should believe]
that his conduct is very likely but not certain to result in a violation"). In the context of
police shootings, courts characterize facts in different manners. Compare Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1990) (officer who shot at hostage
·in escaping vehicle maybe negligent) with Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857
F.2d 638, 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1988) (officer was grossly negligent when his gun accidentally discharged) and Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1987) (officer
was not negligent when his gun accidentally discharged).
319. See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text for courts' contrasting stateof-mind requirements for substantive due process claims.
320. See, e.g., Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.
1989); Taylor ex rei. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
bane); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987).
321. See, e.g., Germany, 868 F.2d at 18.
322. See, e.g., Hannula v. City 'of Lakewootl, 907 F.2d 129, 132 (lOth Cir.
1990); Rasmussen v. Larson, 863 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. '1988). See generally Freeman v. Elgin Sweeper Co., 885 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1989) (no liability for killing of
bicyclist because conduct was not intentional).
323. Balancing is proper because most courts do not require malice in order to
find a violation. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988)
(malice not necessary to establish a constitutional tort); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer,
783 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1986) (liability attaches if force was unreasonable, unnecessary, or violent); see also supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the lesser culpability standards actionable under the fourteenth amendment.
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process is similar to the balancing of interests that the Court recognized under the fourth amendment in Tennessee v. Garneru and Graham v. Connor. 32 "'
Like the Garner/Graham standard, the Glick factors require a
similar balancing of interests. The first factor questions the need for
force, and the second factor questions whether the force used was disproportionate to the need for it. This is similar to the analysis the
Court adopted when it stated that under the fourth amendment the
need for deadly force in Garner or nondeadly force in Graham is to be
measured in light of the risks the suspect poses to others. 326 The third
factor, the extent of the injury, is a disputed factor. Some courts have
used this factor to distinguish between injuries that are of sufficient
magnitude to constitute a constitutional violation and those that represent only a state tort. 327 Other courts, however, have appropriately
refused to apply this factor because it is irrelevant to the central issue
of disproportionalit/ 328 The last factor, malice, is not necessarily a requirement for substantive due process claims, particularly since the Su1
preme Court has not
decided whether gross negligence and recklessness
are actionable under the fourteenth amendment and since not all courts

324. See supra notes 224-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's interest in balancing under the fourth amendment.
. 325. See supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of balancing
of interests in this case.
326. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871-72; Garner, 411 U.S at 11.
327. See, e.g., Hannula, 907 F.2d at 132 (pain from tight handcuffing did not
establish a constitutional violation because plaintiff failed to present evidence that she
incurred "contusions, lacerations or damage to the bones or nerves"). The third factor,
the extent of the injury, may also represent institutional balancing because some courts
use this factor to state that unless there was a "serious" or "significant" injury, then
the conduct does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., White v.
Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990) (sufficient showing to establish excessive
force claim would be that pretrial detainee "lost consciousness" or suffered a "permanent injury").
328. Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (court eliminated its
previous "severe injury" requirement, "observing that a 'state is not free to inflict ...
pains without cause just so long as it is careful to leave no marks'") (quoting Williams
v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988)); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d
Cir. 1987) (injuries need not be permanent or severe under the Glick standard). See
generally Note, Graham v. Connor: A Reasonable Approach to Excessive Force
Claims Against Police Officers, 22 PAC. L.J. 157, 180 (1990) (although extent of injury
factor is relevant "to the damages issue in a section 1983 action, the fourth amendment
standard properly does not require a minimum threshold of injury to establish liability"); Note, Excessive Force Claims: Is Significant Bodily Injury the Sine Qua Non
To Proving a Fourth Amendment Violation, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 741 (1990)
("'significant or meaningful' injury requirement does not comport with the Supreme
Court's decisions in Graham and Tennessee v. Garner and thwarts the broad remedial
purposes of section 1983"); Corselli v Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988) (for
eighth amendment claim injuries need not be permanent or severe).
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require malice. 329
When courts do not require plaintiffs to establish that officers acted maliciously, balancing interests under the fourteenth amendment is
similar to balancing interests under the fourth amendment. 330 Although
courts interpret the balancing process under the fourth amendment in
light of its standard of reasonableness, 331 they balance interests under
the fourteenth amendment in light of its egregious standard. 332 When,

329. Balancing of interests under these amendments is similar only if a court
interprets the fourteenth amendment as not requiring malicious conduct. A court commits reversible error if it instructs a jury on a fourth amendment claim to consider
whether officers acted maliciously. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1873 ("concepts
like 'malice' and 'sadism' have no proper place in [the objective reasonableness] inquiry); Hay v. City of Irving, 893 F.2d 796, 798-99 (5th Cir. 1990); Calamia v. City of
New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989). The similarity in balancing the interests of the parties is apparent by considering the history of excessive force claims. Prior
to the Court's decisions in Garner and Graham, individuals subjected to excessive force
generally alleged a violation of substantive due process, not the fourth amendment.
Plaintiffs began bringing claims under the fourth amendment when lower courts and
later the Supreme Court made it clear that the fourth amendment's standard of objective reasonableness does not consider whether police officers acted maliciously in using
force. Such individuals no longer need the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
330. See, e.g., Titran, 893 F.2d at 147. In Titran, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized that when an individual is injured while in jail, the substantive due
process standard, even with the mental element of malice, is like the fourth amendment
standard. Id. The court stated, "Most of the time the propriety of using force on a
person in custody pending trial will track the [f]ourth [a]mendment: the court must
ask whether the officials behaved in a reasonable way in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them." Id. The court also rejected having "multiple standards" to
evaluate the constitutionality of force because they would "undermine the force of the
law" and would "complicate litigation.~· Id. See also Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699
F. Supp. 1552, 1557 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("there is substantial congruity between what
violates substantive due process with what is unreasonable under the fourth amendment"); Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEo. L.J. 1441, 1491
( 1989) (courts should "end their overreliance on disembodied state-of-mind requirements and begin to identify the more precise constitutional duties to which the mental
elements attach").
Courts have also applied the fourth amendment standard to individuals arrested
and subjected to compelled blood tests. See, e.g., Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200,
1204 (9th Cir. 1989) (blood test of arrestee taken at hospital); State v. Lanier, 452
N.W.2d 144, 145 (S.D. 1990) (blood test of arrestee taken at jail). Courts have also
applied the fourth amendment standard to the force used by prison officials to stop a
prisoner from escaping. See, e.g., Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir. 1989)
(court relies in part on Garner's fourth amendment standard to resolve prisoner's
eighth amendment excessive force claim); Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 880-81 (lith
Cir. 1988) (same).
331. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1873 ("[f]ourth [a]mendment inquiry is
one of 'objective reasonableness'"); Garner, 471 U.S. at 7 .("apprehension by the use of
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the [f]ourth
[a]mendment").
332. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1990) (questioned
whether conduct was shocking).
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however, the interests of both parties under the fourteenth amendment
mirror the interests under the fourth amendment, as they do in the
unique context of a police pursuit, conduct that is unreasonable under
the fourth amendment is, however, also egregious under the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, whether force is lawful generally depends upon the
interests of the parties, not upon the particular standard applied.
This general focus on the parties' interests arises because balancing is a process of weighing opposing interests. The standard of care,
however, does aid courts in evaluating the state's conduct; it focuses
attention on how to weigh the state's interest, but not the individual's
interest in personal security. For example, the Court has recognized
that the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, 333 which
applies only to prisoners, 334 has two different standards of care that
protect a prisoner's right to personal security. During a prison riot, officials violate the right only if they act maliciously, 3311 but in failing to
provide proper medical care, officials violate the right if they act with
"deliberate indifference." 338 In light of these different eighth amendment standards, lower courts have recognized that a prisoner's interest
in personal security is constant, but that the level of culpable conduct
actionable under the eighth amendment depends upon the circumstances facing officials. 337 When no riot is present, the use of force may
violate the eighth amendment .if it signifies "deliberate indifference" to
a prisoner's right to personal security. 338 These two contrasting stan-

333. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments").
334. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977).
335. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). In Whitley, the
Supreme Court stated that prisoners injured must prove malice to establish a violation
of their eighth amendment right to personal security when officials use force during a
riot. Id. To determine whether the force was used maliciously, the Court, however,
declared that the other Glick factors were "relevant to that ultimate determination."
/d. at 321. By using the other Glick factors, the Court was implicitly questioning
whether the force used was disproportionate to the need for it.
336. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). ·
337. See, e.g., Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343, 1350 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 542 (1989) (deliberate indifference actionable because force "occurred after any
threat to institutional security had been quelled"); Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124,
135-36 (1st Cir. 1988) (summary judgment not possible because factual dispute exists
as to whether there was a prison disturbance); Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 54-55
(5th Cir. 1987) (applies "unnecessary and wanton" standard because "[t]here was no
imminent danger").
338. See supra note 335. Some courts, however, have erroneously applied the
malice standard when a riot is not present because they have extended the Whitley
standard to any type of prison disturbance. See, e.g., Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23,
26 (2d Cir. 1988); James v. Alfred, 835 F.2d 605, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1036 (1988); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188-90 (11th Cir. 1987),
reh'g denied, 818 F.2d 871 (lith Cir. 1987). These courts may perhaps assume that if
officials fail to establish authority with a single prisoner, this failure may lead to a ·
general lack of control over prisoners.
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dards both describe conduct that is "cruel and unusual" within the
meaning of the eighth amendment. 339
Thus, to recognize "two" standards of care under the fourteenth
amendment, that is, to discern that unreasonable conduct during a pursuit constitutes "egregious" conduct within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's intepretations of the "cruel and unusual punishments" language of the
eighth amendment. Whether one evaluates fourteenth amendment pursuit claims under a standard of reasonableness or egregiousness, resolution of an excessive force claim generally requires a balancing of interests. Balancing the interests of the parties under the fourteenth
amendment in the context of police pursuits indicates that many pursuits constitute the use of egregious force. 3"0
2. Applying the Substantive Due Process Standard to Pursuit
Claims
When police officers pursue a driver, they may cause individuals in
other vehiclesm and pedestrians 3u to be injured as a result of the pursuit.m Whether these individuals may properly assert claims under the
substantive due process component of the fourteenth amendment depends upon whether .the officers used egregious force under the circumstances.3"" The issue requires courts to balance the interests of the par-

339. See, e.g., Whitley, 415 U.S. at 320-21 (discussing claims for inadequate
medical care and the use of force during a riot).
340. See infra notes 341-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourteenth amendment pursuit claims.
341. See, e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 295-96 (8th Cir.
1989) (pursued driver crashed into other motorists, who were seriously injured); Jones
v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1987) (pursued driver crashed into other
motorist, who died); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't., 721 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D.
Ark. 1989) (motorist killed when police pursuit terminated); Timko v. City of Hazleton, 665 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (pursued driver crashed into other motorist, who died).
342. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Harris, 490 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (police officer's cruiser hooked fenders with
pursued driver's bumper, causing the vehicle to go off the road and kill a pedestrian
sitting on a bus bench). See generally Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 144 (1990) (court stated in dicta that third party
injured by officers' actions may have a valid substantive due process claim).
343. These individuals have standing to bring fourteenth amendment pursuit
claims because they are not "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment
during pursuits. See infra notes 378, 400-01, 432 and accompanying text for a discussion of when the fourteenth amendment is applicable to excessive force claims.
344. See, e.g., Jones, 827 F.2d at 1106; Tagstrom, 668 F. Supp. at 1273. See
generally Checki, 785 F.2d at 538 (driver pursued by unmarked car alleged a violation
of substantive due process because pursuit may signify egregious conduct).

268

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:205

ties to determine whether the force used was egregious. 3411 An
examination of this issue reveals that many pursuits violate the substantive due process clause.
Determining whether the force used by police officers during a
pursuit violates the fourteenth amendment requires weighing the interests of the injured drivers and pedestrians against the state's interests.
The individuals' interest is in bodily integrity and the state's interest is
in law enforcement. In Johnson v. Glick, 346 Judge Friendly first articulated the factors used in the process of weighing these interests: the
need for the force, the relationship of the need for force and the
amount of force used, the extent of the injury, and the state of mind of
the officials. 347 The first two factors aid in determining whether the use
of force during 'a pursuit constituted the use of egregious force. 3 " 8 Applying these factors to pursuits indicates that many pursuits constitute
the use of disproportionate force.
The first three Glick factors compel scrutiny of the means chosen
by police officers in furthering their interest in law enforcement. These
factors question whether the force used by officers furthered the state's
interest in law enforcement but unnecessarily infringed an individual's
interest in bodily integrity.
When police officers decide to pursue an individual, regardless of
the offense he has alledgedly committed, the pursuit places other drivers and pedestrians in greater danger. Pursuit of the alleged violator
logically furthers the state's interest in law enforcement. If the public
knows that a police department has adopted a policy of not pursuing
individuals, then many drivers may feel they have little to lose by attempting to flee. Such actions would clearly diminish the state's interest in law enforcement.
To recognize the need to promote the state's interest in law enforcement is not, however, to approve of pursuits as a means of encouraging people to stop. The need for pursuits is measured in relationship
to the harm that pursuits can engender and the availability of other
means that can further the state's interest in law enforcement. Although the factors appear to invite courts to second guess the law enforcement decisions of agencies, a practice expressly disfavored by the
Supreme Court, 349 in the context of excessive force claims such scru-

345. See supra notes 310-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing of interests for fourteenth amendment excessive force claims.
346. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414
u.s. 1033 (1973).
347. Id. at 1033. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these factors.
348. See supra notes 327-329 for a discussion of why courts have refused to
apply to other two factors to excessive force claims.
349. See supra note 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
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tiny is the rule, not the exception. 3110 The right to personal security is of
such importance that such scrutiny has occurred under both the fourteenth amendment and the fourth amendment.
Pursuits can cause injuries to other drivers and pedestrians, individuals who have not committed any offense. Their lives may be in danger when police officers pursue a driver and when the driver himself
represents a threat to others. The prudence of pursuing a driver, however, depends upon the circumstances confronting an officer. Determining the weight of the state's interests and the individual's interests is
similar to weighing the interests of the parties under the fourth amendment. Under both amendments, the interests are similar. The only difference is that the individual's interest in personal security is not diminished because the individual has not allegedly committed any
offense. In contrast, the interest of the pursued driver may in some
sense be considered diminished.
Applying the Garner/Graham standard 3 ~ to substantive due process pursuit claims would indicate that police officers violate the standard of care under the fourteenth amendment if their conduct also violates the fourth amendment. 352 Although the fourteenth amendment
measures the state's conduct by a standard of egregiousness and the
fourth amendment measures the conduct under a standard of reasona~
bleness, conduct unreasonable under the fourth amendment would be
egregious under the fourteenth amendment because of the similar balancing process.
The focus of the Garner/Graham standard is on the harm that a
suspect presents to others if no.t apprehended immediately. One measure of the danger requires an evaluation of the offense that the individual has allegedly committed. If the pursued driver has committed a
nonserious offense, then pursuit increases the likelihood of harm to
other drivers and pedestrians. The standard also implicitly considers
whether police officers can use other means to apprehend the driver or
deter flight. As stated previously, other means are available to protect a
state's interest in law enforcement. 3 ~ 3
Both the fourteenth and fourth amendment thus protect an individual's interest in personal security. When police officers use force that
1

recent deference to a police department's decision to establish roadblocks to apprehend
intoxicated drivers.
350. See supra note 175 and accompanying text for the heightened scrutiny that
the Court has applied to personal security claims involving excessive force.
351. See supra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
fourth amendment standard.
352. See, e.g., Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) (in reviewing
an officer's use of force, the analysis should examine whether the force they applied is
unreasonable, not egregious, even if the fourteenth amendment is applicable).
353. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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is disproportionate to the need for it, they have infringed the individual's interest in personal security. Whether a claim is viable under the
fourth or the fourteenth amendment also depends upon whether the
injured individual was "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 8114 The class of injured individuals seized during a pursuit
may allege a violation of the fourth amendment.m Other individuals
may allege a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 8116

V.

DEFINING A FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEIZURE"

The Supreme Court has articulated the following three definitions
for determining whether police officers have seized an individual:
(1) whether "the officer, by means of physical force or show of au-

thority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen";m (2)
whether "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave";m and (3) whether there was "a governmental termination
of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. " 389
The third definition, which the Court recently set forth, is dramatically
different from the Court's earlier definitions. The Court's most recent
definition engrafts upon the fourth amendment a requirement that officers intentionally apply the means of force that cause an individual to
stop; 860 it requires courts to consider complex causation issues, 861 and it
drastically narrows the protections under the fourth amendment. 862
Analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amend354. See infra notes 357-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of what
constitutes a fourth amendment '.'seizure."
355. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 ("all claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the [f]ourth
[a]mendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under 'substantive due process' approach") (emphasis in original)).
356. See, e.g., id. at 1871 n.IO (pretrial detainees may assert substantive due
process as a basis for an excessive force claim).
357. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.l6 (1968). See infra notes 366-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of this definition.
358. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion for Justices Stewart and Rehnquist); see a/so INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,215 (1984). See
infra notes 384-402 and accompanying text for a discussion of this definition.
359. Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original).
See infra notes 404-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of this definition.
360. See infra notes 426-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the intentionality requirement under the third definition.
361. See infra notes 422-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causation issue under the third definition.
362. See infra notes 423-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
third definition narrows the protection of the right to personal security under the fourth
amendment.
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ment indicates that when police pursue, the pursued driver and any
passengers are always "seized" when applying the first two definitions383 but not always "seized" when applying the third definition. 384
Other drivers and pedestri~ns, however, are not seized within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 3811 They may, however, seek to protect their right to personal security under the substantive due process
component of the fourteenth amendment. 388
A.

The First "Seizure" Definition

The first definition of the word "seizure" occurred when the Court
questioned whether the fourth amendment is implicated when police
officers do not arrest individuals, but instead demand that they stop and
answer questions. 367 No one ever questioned whether an arrest was a
"seizure" because the infringement of the right to personal security is
obvious. In Terry v. Ohio, 868 the Court determined that when police
officers compel an individual to stop, they have seized the person within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 369 Although the Court recognized the need for police officers to stop individuals, it held that such
stops must be subject to fourth amendment scrutiny because the "inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study." 370 By
holding that compelled stops constitute seizures, the Court thus required stops to also be "reasonable" within the meaning of fourth
amendment. 371
The Terry Court, however, crafted a definition of a seizure that
indicated that not all stops are fourth amendment "seizures." When
police officers compel a person to stop, the individual is seized, but
when police officers merely ask a person to stop and answer questions,
the individual is not seized, even if he stops. 372 The latter is only a

363. See infra notes 379-80, 403 and accompanying text for an application of the
first and second definitions to individuals involved in a police pursuit.
364. See infra notes 432-57 and accompanying text for an application of the
third definition to police pursuits.
365. See infra notes 380, 403, 434 and accompanying text for an application of
the definitions to these individuals.
366. See generally Graham, l 09 S. Ct at 1871 n.l 0 (individuals not seized may
assert substantive due process as a basis for an excessive force claim). But see Roach,
882 F.2d at 297 (applied fourth amendment to oncoming motorist's claim); Britt, 721
F. Supp. at 190 (applied fourth amendment to bystander's claim).
367. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.l6.
368. 392 U.S. I (1968).
369. !d. at 16.
370. /d. at 8-9.
371. !d. at 20 (although a warrant is not necessary to stop an individual, the
officer's conduct must still be reasonable).
372. See, e.g., id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (police officers may ask individu-
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consensual encounter. 878 The Court explained, "Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred." 874 The first definition thus contains one bright-line marker,
the use of physical force, and one more flexible aspect, the "show of
authority," 8711 which constitutes psychological force.
The "show of authority" aspect of a "seizure" is more difficult to
determine because it requires courts to distinguish encounters from
stops. An encounter occurs if police officers ask casual questions, questions that are not psychologically coercive. A stop occurs, however, if
police officers demonstrate a "show of authority," psychological force
that constitutes a restraint of a citizen's liberty. 876 Drawing the line
between these two types of contact is difficult because resolution of the
issue depends upon the degree of psychological force that police officers
use. Every individual, unless police officers have reasonable suspicion to
believe that an individual has committed an offense, "may refuse to
cooperate and go on his way."m Under the Terry definition, a request
to stop thus is not a seizure, 878 but a command to do so is one because
it constitutes a "show of authority." 879
Applying this first definition to the context of police pursuits indicates that police officers "seize" the pursued driver and her passengers
because the pursuit itself constitutes a "show of authority" directed at

als questions without implicating the fourth amendment); see also Florida v. Royer,
460 u.s. 491, 497-98 (1983).
373. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (a person has a
right "to ignore his interrogator and walk away"); see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
555 (person could have reasonably believed that she was "free to end the conversation .
. . and proceed on her way").
374. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.l6.
375. /d.
376. /d.
377. /d. at 34 (Harlan, J., concurring).
378. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 219-21 (1984) (factory survey of
workers did not constitute a seizure, but was an example of consensual encounters); ·
Royer, 460 U.S. at 503 n.9 (coercive conduct indicated a seizure); Terry, 392 U.S. at
34 (White, J., concurring); see also W. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(h), at 408 (2d ed. 1987) (Supreme Court distinguishes
stops from encounters by relying "upon the amorphous concept of consent": a person
may indicate a lack of consent "by ignoring the officer's summfiming or by leaving his
presense," ... and officer would "seize" the person by attempting to "renew the encounter"); Note, Michigan v. Chesternut and the Investigative Pursuits: Is There No
End to the War Between the Constitution and Common Sense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 203,
208 ( 1988) (an encounter occurs when "a police officer accosts an individual and asks
questions").
379. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (fourth amendment is applicable to
" 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and
prosecution for crime - 'arrests' in traditional terminology").
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these individuals. 380 Other drivers and their passengers and pedestrians,
however, are not "seized" because the police officers' show of authority
does not communicate to these individuals a command to stop as it does
to the pursued driver and his passengers. The command implicit in a
pursuit can be discerned by comparing it to the officers' first act of
signalling the driver to pull over to the side of the road. The signalling
is a request that the driver comply with the officer's suggestion. A pursuit, however, uses psychological force to compel a stop. This force is
apparent by the aggressive manner in which officers use their cruisers
to stop individuals. This interpretation of the Terry "show of authority" definition is supported by the Court's second "seizure" definition,
which in essence elaborated on what the Court meant by "show of
authority."

B.

The Second "Seizure" Definition

Applying the Court's Terry definition, however, proved to be difficult for the Court. The Court often decided cases by less than a majority.381 In 1984, sixteen years after Terry, a majority of the Court 382
adopted the second "seizure" definition first articulated by Justice
Stewart four years earlier. 383 Under this second definition, the focus
was on how a reasonable suspect would interpret the police officers'
conduct. 384 If "'a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave,' " 3811 then a seizure had occurred. The second
"seizure" definition thus appeared to be an elaboration of the Terry
Court's first "show of authority" standard: if a reasonable person would
feel compelled to stop because of the police officers' conduct, the stop
was a result of the officers' use of psychological force.
In first articulating this definition, Justice Stewart specified some
factors that would be relevant in determining that officers' used their
authority to compel a stop: " [ 1] the threatening presence of several
officers, [2] the display of a weapon by an officer, [3] some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or [4] the use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officers' request might be

380. Professor Lafave has maintained that when police officers engage "in conduct significl\ntly beyond that accepted in social intercourse" they are using coercive
conduct that signifies a fourth amendment seizure. W. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON fOURTH AMENDMENT§ 9.2(h), at 412 (2d ed. 1987). The use of sirens
and lights suggests that officers use their authority in compelling an individual to stop,
conduct "beyond that accepted in social intercourse."
381. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S 544 (1980).
382. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 211.
383. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., concurring).
384. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.
385. /d. (quoting Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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compelled." 886 Although these factors provide guidance in determining
whether a person has been "seized," this definition, like the first definition, requires consideration of all the circumstances to assess the degree
of psychological compulsion. 887
The two similar definitions of "seizure" articulated by the Court
occurred in cases in which the suspect actually stopped in response to
the police officers' conduct. Not until 1988 in Michigan v. Chesternut888 did the Court address whether a person could be "seized" if
he had not in fact stopped. In Chesternut, an individual standing at an
intersection saw a patrol car and began to run. 889 When the patrol car
followed "him for a short distance," 890 the individual threw away some
packets that had been in his jacket. 891 The Court determined that
under these circumstances no seizure had occurred either before or
upon the individual's discarding of the packets. 892
In Chesternut, the Court quoted the first Terry definition 898 but
applied the second definition of a seizure. 894 In applying the second definition, the Court focused on the circumstances as they appeared to the
individual. The issue was whether the police officers' conduct in the
particular setting would have "communicated to the reasonable person
an attempt to capture." 896 In this case, the police officers merely "followed" the individual, a common investigative practice. 896 An attempt
to capture, however, constitutes a fourth amendment seizure. To distinguish the act of mere following from an act that communicates an attempt to capture, the Court implied that the following factors indicate
an attempt to capture: (1) the use of sirens or flashers, (2) the commanding of an individual to halt, and (3) driving a "car in an aggressive manner" in order to block or to control "the direction or speed of

386. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55.
387. Professor LaFave has aptly noted that the Court could not have meant to
create a "seizure" definition that would have made all encounters fourth amendment
"seizures." W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 9.2(h), at 411 (2d ed. 1987). He surmised that few individuals feel free to ignore a
police officer's request to stop and answer questions. /d. at 410. Although psychological
pressure is inherent in every confrontation between a citizen and a police officer, a
"seizure" occurs, according to Professor LaFave, only if "the officer adds to those inherent pressures by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in social
intercourse." /d. at 412.
567 (1988).
388. 486
389. /d. at 569.
390. /d.
391. /d.
392. Id. at 574.
393. /d. at 573.
394. Id. at 573-76.
395. Id. at 575.
396. Id. at 569.
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[an individual's] movement." 397 Because these factors were not implicated in Chesternut, no seizure occurred.
In articulating the factors, the Court reaffirmed the totality of circumstances approach first articulated in the "show of authority" aspect
of Terry and the second "seizure" definition. The Court explicitly refused to adopt the two contrasting, bright-line "seizure" definitions advocated by the parties. 398 It rejected the individual's argument that all
"chases" constitute seizures and the state's argument that all seizures
require the individual to stop. 399 The Court explained that bright-line
rules are inappropriate because the focus of the seizure issue is whether
the police officers' conduct was "coercive." 400 To determine whether
conduct was coercive requires consideration of all the facts. The Court
thus adhered to its two definitions for "seizures" because they are
"fiexible"401 in application, even if they are "necessarily imprecise. " 402
Applying the Chesternut decision to police pursuits indicates that
the pursued driver and her passengers are "seized" during a pursuit
because the pursuit communicates an attempt to capture. Other motorists and pedestrians, however, are not "seized" during a pursuit because
the officers' conduct does not signify an attempt to capture these other
individuals.
The factors the Court articulated in Chesternut are present during
pursuits. Police officers use sirens and flashers during pursuits. They
also use their car aggressively. By using multiple vehicles, police officers may control the pursued's direction of travel. They also control
the pursued's speed. Pursuit experts agree that if police officers were to
stop the pursuit, the individual would either soon stop and park the car
or return home. 403 The typical pursuit thus clearly communicates an
attempt to capture the pursued driver and her passengers. It does not,
however, communicate an attempt to capture any other motorists or
397. /d. at 575.
398. Id. at 572-73.
399. Id.
400. /d. at 573 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
401. Id.
402. /d. The United States Supreme Court recently decided to review a case that
may help to define the psychological force aspect of fourth amendment "seizures." Bostick v. Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 241 (1990). The
Court has agreed to address the following question: "May the police, without violating
the fourth amendment, board an interstate bus and ask for, and receive, consent to
search a passenger's luggage where they advise the passenger that he has the right to
refuse?" 59 U.S.L.W. (1990). The Florida Supreme Court had determined that police
officers had used intimidation to seize the passenger. 554 So. 2d at 1157. An officer had
partially blocked the bus exit, had appeared to carry a gun, and had requested to
search the passenger's luggage during a brief layover, thus prohibiting the passenger
from leaving the bus. /d.
403. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of how police officers may control a pursued driver's speed.

276

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:205

pedestrians.
C.

The Third "Seizure" Definition

The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Brower v. County of
Inyo," 04 however, makes it less clear that pursuits generally constitute
"seizures" of the pursued driver and her passengers." 05 In Brower, the
Court offered a third definition of a seizure: a seizure occurs "only
when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied."" 08 In articulating this new definition for a "seizure," the Court never explained whether the third definition replaces or supplements the prior definitions. 407 In extensive dicta
404. 489 u.s. 593 (1989).
405. /d. at 596. In dicta the Brower Court discussed whether a pursued driver
who stops as a result of losing control of her vehicle is "seized" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. /d. It determined that under those circumstances, police officers
have not intentionally stopped the individual and therefore have not effectuated a
fourth amendment seizure. /d. (citing with approval Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200,
202-03 (6th Cir. 1986)). The Court, however, characterized these circumstances as
involving an "unexpected" loss of control. /d. How one characterizes the likelihood of a
crash is a question of perspective. See infra notes 422-31 and accompanying text discussing the characterization of the causation issue. The Court, however, later stated
that the question of what caused an individual to stop should not be narrowly characterized. /d. at 1382. It declared that if a person is "stopped by the very instrumentality
set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result," the individual was seized.
/d. The Court's broad characterization of causation thus appears inconsistent with its
narrow characterization of causation regarding a stop by a pursued driver who loses
control of her vehicle.
406. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (emphasis omitted).
407. Since its decision in Brower, the Court has applied both the first and third
"seizure" definitions. See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485 (applies and quotes third definition);
Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.lO (quotes first definition and cites Brower). In neither
of these cases, however, did the parties dispute whether the individual had been seized.
Many lower courts have not applied the third definition in determining whether an
individual has been seized. See, e.g., Flowers, 912 F.2d. at 170-12 (applies second definition; person on departing bus was not seized by police officers although the departure
may have psychologically constrained the individual); Jones v. State, 572 A.2d 169,
172 (Md. 1990) (cites Brower but applies the second definition; police officers seized
the suspect by commanding him to halt because the statement communicated an attempt to capture).
Some courts, however, have applied the third definition. See, e.g., Landol-Rivera v.
Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 794-96 (1st Cir. 1990) (even though police officers knew
the passenger of a pursued driver was a hostage, the passenger was not seized when an
officer shot at the driver and hit the passenger); Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708
(4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990) (court applied Brower
and determined that a pursued driver was not seized when he hit a bump in the road
that caused him to lose control of his car).
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case that may explain how to
interpret the third definition. California v. Hodari, 59 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 2,
1990) (No. 89-1632). The Court agreed to address two issues: "(l) Is physical restraint
required for seizure of person under the Fourth Amendment? (2) May citizen who is
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the Court limited when pursuits can constitute seizures.' 08
In Brower, police officers seized the decedent when he crashed into
a roadblock, which they had intentionally set up to stop him.' 09 Thus,
in this case, like all the other "seizure" cases previously examined' 10
except Michigan v. Chesternut,m the individual had actually stopped.
The new definition, although easily applied in this case, in some respects conflicts with prior "seizure" definitions.' 12 The new definition of
"seizure" has two elements: termination of movement 413 and causation.41' Under this definition an individual must always stop in order to
be "seized," and the stop must occur as a result of means intentionally
applied by police officers.
1.

The Stop Requirement

The first element requires the individual to stop. 4111 This requirement, however, was explicitly rejected by the Chesternut majority opin-

pursued by police officer on public street immunize himself from prosecution by discarding incriminating evidence and asserting that he did so out of fear of unlawful
search?" Id. In Hodari, police officers had chased the defendant on foot and "ran in
such a fashion to cut him off and confront him head on." California v. Hodari, 265
Cal. Rptr. 79, 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). When the officers were eleven feet from the
defendant, the defendant discarded some drugs. /d. The court found that Chesternut,
which involved officers following a suspect, was applicable, rather than Brower, which
involved officers setting up a roadblock to stop the suspect. See supra notes 388-402,
404 and accompanying text and infra notes 408-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. The California Court of Appeals mentioned all three "seizure"
definitions. See Hodari, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 82-84. The court explictly rejected using the
third definition in favor of applying the second definition. /d. at 84. It did not find the
third definition applicable to the facts of the case. /d.
If the Court were to require actual "physical restraint," a standard requested by
the state government, the Court would have to overrule its landmark case of Terry v.
Ohio, which first established that a "show of authority" constituted a "seizure." Although actual physical restraint would be a bright-line for law enforcement officials, it
would drastically curtail the personal liberty of citizens.
408. /d. at 1381. See infra notes 436-58 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Court's dicta regarding police pursuits.
409. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598.
410. See supra notes 368-403 and accompanying text for a discussion of fourth
amendment "seizures."
411. 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988). See supra notes 388-403 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this case and fourth amendment "seizures."
412. See infra notes 415-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contrasting "seizure" definitions.
413. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-599. See infra notes 415-21 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the stop requiremept.
414. /d. See infra notes 422-431 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
causation requirement.
415. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. The Court stated that a person is seized when
there is a "governmental termination of freedom of movement." /d.
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ion, which had applied the second "seizure" definition.• 18 In Brower,
the Court never cited the cases in which it had established the two
prior "seizure" definitions, nor cases that elaborated on these well recognized definitions. To explain the new "seizure" definition, the Court
quoted from Tennessee v. Garner,• 17 which stated, "Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of movement of a person to walk away, he
has seized that person."u 8 In Garner, however, no one ever disputed or
would dispute that officers had seized the decedent by intentionally killing him as he fled. The reference to Garner, however, supported the
two elements of the new definition: in Garner, a "seizure" occurred because the bullet stopped the decedent, and a police officer, a governmental actor, intentionally caused the stop.
Aspects of the two prior "seizure" definitions, however, still have
applicability to fourth amendment claims, even under the third definition, but only if a stop occurred. For example, in Graham v. Connor,ue
the Supreme Court quoted the first definition to explain when the
fourth amendment applies, but also cited the Brower decision, in which
it articulated the third definition. •:ao In Graham, officers used both
physical and psychological force in stopping an individual.m The
"show of authority" definition may thus aid courts in determining
"seizures" under the third definition if the individual has actually
stopped. The requirement of an actual stop, however, is clearly inconsistent with the second definition elaborated upon in Chesternut.
2. ·The Causation Requirement
The second element of the third "seizure" definition, causation, is
difficult to understand .• 22 The Brower opinion appears to specify two
causation questions for fourth amendment claims. Under the third deft-

416. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 572-73. Only Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinion in Brower, and Justice Kennedy advocated an actual restraint test. /d. at
577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Chesternut concurrence emphatically rejected the
prior two "seizure" definitions because under the actual restraint test no seizure occurs,
even if there was "an unmistakable show of authority" (the first "seizure" definition),
and even if "the officers' conduct communicates to a person a reasonable belief that
they intend to apprehend him" (the second "seizure" definition). /d.
417. 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
418. Brower, 489 U.S. at 595 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)). The Garner Court used two sentences to explain that a police officer seized a suspect by killing
him. 471 U.S. at 7.
419. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
420. /d. at 1871 n.10.
421. /d. at 1868. The officers used physical force by handcuffing and beating the
suspect. /d. They used psychological force by making an "investigative stop."
422. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. The individual must stop as a result of "means
intentionally applied." /d. (emphasis in original).
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nition, the officers' conduct must have caused the individual to stop. 428
This causation question, according to the Court, is different from the
question of whether the officers' conduct caused the stopped individual's injuries. 424 The question of what caused an injury, as opposed to
what caused a stop, is a familiar issue in constitutional litigation. For
years the Court has borrowed tort concepts to define the scope of protection available under various amendments. 4211 To be liable for a person's injuries, officials must have caused them.
The question of what caused a stop, however, is both a familiar
and an unfamiliar issue. It is a familiar inquiry in cases in which the
individual actually stopped. Prior "seizure" definitions in essence questioned whether the stop was compelled or voluntary; that is, did the
police officers' "show of authority" cause the individual to stop or did
the individual voluntarily stop. 428 The question is also unfamiliar because it appears to suggest that all seizures must be the result of intentional conduct.
What the Court means by intentional conduct is unclear. The
Court seems to emphasize the means intentionally used by police officers to stop an individual and deemphasize the individual's culpable
behavior in fleeing. 427 The Court stated that if police officers "sideswipe[]" a vehicle and the touching causes the individual to lose control
and crash, a seizure has occurred, even if the officers did not subjectively intend to cause an "accident."428 "Intent" in this example ap-

423. /d.
424. The facts and dicta in Brower suggest a method to distinguish these causation issues. /d. at 594-598. In Brower, police officers chased the decedent for about 20
miles. /d. at 594. The officers decided to stop him by setting up a roadblock. /d. When
the decedent crashed into the roadblock, the police officers caused him to stop. Id. at
599. The issue of whether the police officers caused his injuries, according to the Court,
may depend upon whether the officers had caused the decedent to crash into the roadblock by blinding him with their headlights. /d. The Brower opinion thus states that
the roadblock allegedly caused the decedent to stop, but that it may not necessarily
have caused the decedent's injuries. /d.
425. See, e.g., Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEo. L.J.
1441, 1445-1459 (1989); Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1729-30 (1989).
426. See supra notes 367-403 and accompanying text for a discusssion of these
prior definitions.
427. The significance of this focus is apparent by considering the lower court's
holding in Brower, which emphasized the culpability of the decedent during the chase,
not the means the police officers used. Brower, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (1987), rev'd, 489
U.S. 593, 599 (1989). Even though the decedent crashed into the roadblock, the lower
court surprisingly determined that no seizure had occurred. /d. at 546-47. The Court
drew this erroneous conclusion by stressing that the decedent could have avoided crashing into the roadblock by stopping the chase. /d. at 546. Under this interpretation, the
reasonableness of the roadblock would thus evade scrutiny because there would have
been no "seizure" implicating the fourth amendment.
428. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
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pears to be similar to the traditional tort standard of intent, which
states that conduct is nevertheless intentional if the harm that occurred
was "substantially certain" to follow from a person's act. 429 The officers' subjective state of mind is not controlling. Instead, the focus is
on the means the officers' used in effecting a stop.•ao
Thus, under the third "seizure" definition, the causation question
is whether the stop was substantially certain to occur in light of the
means used by the officers. "Intent" in this context is an objective question, which focuses on the means the officers used, not the officers' subjective beliefs about how they intended to stop an individual.m
3.

Applying the Third "Seizure" Definition to Pursuits

The third "seizure" definition articulated in Brower is more restrictive than prior definitions because it imposes the requirement that
an individual stop. Fleeing from the officers' "show of authority" is insufficient under the third definition, but sufficient under the first two
definitions. The third definition is also more restrictive because police
officers must intentionally, not recklessly, cause the stop. Under this
narrow definition, most pursuits nevertheless implicate the fourth
amendment. An application of this definition to four easily identifiable
pursuit situations indicates that most pursued drivers and their passengers are seized when they stop, whether voluntarily or as a result of a
crash, but that injured pedestrians and other drivers and their passengers are not seized.
First, an individual and any passengers are seized if they stop after
abandoning their flight. In this situation, the officers' "show of authority" caused the stop; it communicated an attempt to capture them. One
could hardly call the stop a consensual encounter. Flashing lights, sirens, and aggressive driving indicate the officers' use of psychological
force, means intentionally applied to cause the individual to stop.
The remaining examples are more complex because they involve
crashes: police officers crashing into the pursued driver, police officers
crashing into pedestrians and other drivers, and the pursued driver
crashing into other drivers or an object. According to the Brower
429. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 8, at 35 (5th ed. 1984).
.
430. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597-598. See generally Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872-73
(officers' subjective state of mind is not relevant to determining whether force was
reasonable).
431. Thus, according to the Court under the third definition, even the "accidental firing" of a gun can constitute intentional conduct only because the emphasis is on
the means used by the officers to stop the individual. Some courts, however, have determined that an accidental shooting does not constitute a seizure. See. e.g.. Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795-96 (1990); see also supra note 114 (collecting
cases).
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Court, if police officers intentionally crash into the individual's vehicle,
then a seizure of the driver and any passengers occurs. 482 Although the
officers may be unaware that the vehicle has passengers, the intentional
act of crashing into the vehicle to stop the driver is an act that is substantially certain to cause any passenger to stop. 488 In this example,
both the pursued driver and passengers are "seized."
If police officers accidentally crash into other cars or pedestrians
during their pursuit of another individual, then neither pedestrians nor
the other drivers and their passengers have been seized. 484 The stopping
of these other individuals is not substantially certain to occur. In that
case, the fourteenth amendment, not the fourth amendment, may protect their right to personal security. 4811
If the pursued driver stops because he accidentally crashes into
another driver or an object, police officers under some circumstances
may have seized the driver and his passengers. This seizure issue is
difficult because of the Brower Court's discussion in dicta of this example.488 The Court stated that if an individual stops during a pursuit
because he "unexpectedly" loses control of his vehicle and crashes, then

432. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
433. The First Circuit has used an individualist perspective in interpreting the
intentionality requirement of the third definition. Lando/-Rivera, 906 F.2d at 795. The
court determined that even if police officers shoot a passenger in a vehicle, only the
individual they intend to apprehend can be "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. !d. The court stated, "A police officer's deliberate decision to shoot at a
car containing a robber and a hostage for the purpose of stopping the robber's flight
does not result in the sort of willful detention of the hostage that the [f]ourth
[a]mendment was designed to govern." /d. (emphasis in original). This narrow interpretation of the third definition is absurd. It implicitly focuses on an officer's subjective
intent in determining whether a person was seized, a focus explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g.• Graham. 109 S. Ct. at 1873. It also implicitly condones
reckless conduct on the part of police officers by shielding this fourth amendment issue
from scrutiny. The court should have determined that the passenger was seized and
then determined whether the shooting was reasonable under the fourth amendment.
434. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. The Brower Court explained that "if a parked and
unoccupied police car slips its brakes and pins a passerby against a wall, it is likely that
a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth Amendment." !d.
435. See supra notes 294-356 and accompanying text for a discussion of the applicability of the fourteenth amendment.
436. Brower, 489 U.S. at 595-96. The Court explicitly approved of a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, in which the circuit court had determined that no
seizure had occurred when police officers chased an individual using flashing lights. !d.
(citing Galas, 801 F.2d at 202-203). The Sixth Circuit, however, was unsure of its
ruling because it stated that even if the individual had been seized, the police officer's
conduct was nevertheless reasonable. See Galas, 801 F.2d at 203-204. The Sixth Circuit decision also occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in Chesternut, which
determined that police officers who chased an individual using flashing lights had not
seized him. See supra notes 388-403 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case.
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no seizure has occurred. 487 In this situation, according to the Court, the
means of stopping the individual - the "unexpected" accident - was
not intentionally used by the officers:ua Crashes, however, during pursuits are frequent. Police officers are often trained to "stay with the
individual" because the individual will eventually crash. To continue
chasing an individual is to employ means intentionally designed to produce a stop because crashes are generally "expected" stops when police
officers pursue. Crashes under these circumstances should thus constitute "seizures."
The above examples indicate the nature of fourth amendment
seizures. Because these examples assume that a crash was or was not
intentional, they do not reveal that the issue of what caused a stop is
subject to both broad and narrow interpretations. Resolution of any
causation issue depends not only upon how one characterizes the facts,
but also upon the policies underlying the scope of liability. Because the
Brower Court adopted a communalist perspective439 in discussing cau- .
sation to stop, courts should similarly broadly interpret the causation
issue.
The Court was able to broadly interpret the causation issue in
Brower by using five rhetorical devices to express the communalistic
viewpoint: ( 1) general factual characterization to emphasize the responsibility of the police officers and to deemphasize the responsibility
of the decedent, (2) narrow characterization of the decedent's free will,
(3) broad time frame for inculpatory facts relating to the police and
narrow time frame for inculpatory facts relating to the decedent, (4)
abstract description of the foreseeability of the stop, and (5) .broad
linking of the police officers' setting up of the roadblock to the stop. 440
The Court's adherence to a communalistic perspective is apparent by
contrasting its decision with the lower court's decision, which expressed
an individualistic perspective.

437. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
438. Under the third definition, the conduct must be "intentional." Professor
Keeton, however, has stated that "the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risksomething short of substantial certainty - is not intent." W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R.
KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 8, at 36 (5th ed. 1984).
Distinguishing intentional conduct from less culpable conduct is difficult. See. e.g.•
Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1494-96 (lOth Cir. 1990) (courts have
often struggled to distinguish intentional conduct from conduct that represents recklessness, gross negligence, and deliberate indifference).
·
439. The Brower Court used rhetorical devices to further a "communalistic" perspective, one that requires a broad interpretation of the causation issue. See infra notes
440-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court expressed this communalist perspective. See supra notes 65-68, 84-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the communalist perspective.
440. See supra notes 65-7 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of Professor
Balkin's theory of communalism and individualism.
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In Brower, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision,
which had determined that no seizure occurred. 441 The Supreme Court
described the facts to emphasize the responsibility of the police officers
in setting up the roadblock and to deemphasize the decedent's responsibility for his act of fleeing. 442 The lower court, however, emphasized the
decedent's culpable act of fleeing and deemphasized the police officers'
act of setting up the roadblock. 443
Naturally linked to factual characterization in this context is the
issue of free will. The Supreme Court narrowly described the options
available to the decedent after the officers established the roadblock. 444
It never focused on whether the decedent could have stopped in determining whether the officers had seized him. Thus, the Court narrowly
viewed the decedent's free will and broadly defined the police officers'
choices, which included the option of discontinuing the pursuit. In contrast, the lower court broadly defined the decedent's options. It emphasized that even after the officers had established the roadblock, the decedent could have stopped voluntarily. 4411
The courts' characterizations are also related to the time frame
they use to describe the events. The Supreme Court limited the time
frame to exclude the decedent's inculpatory act of fleeing. It focused on
the decedent's act of approaching the roadblock at a high speed. 448 The
lower court, however, expanded the time frame to include the pursuit
that preceded the roadblock. It emphasized that any time prior to the
roadblock, the decedent remained fr:ee to stop. 447
Whether the stop was foreseeable depends on whether abstract or
concrete terms are used to describe the likelihood of the stop. The Supreme Court used abstract terms to describe the likelihood that the
roadblock would stop the decedent. 448 A seizure occurs if a person is
"stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in
order to achieve that result." 449 The Court did not focus on whether the
decedent could have actually stopped to determine the seizure issue. 4110
The Court warned that the issue of what caused a stop should not be

441. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599.
442. Id.
443. Brower, 817 F.2d at 546.
444. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598.
445. 817 F.2d at 546-47.
446. 489 U.S. at 598.
447. 817 F.2d at 546.
448. 489 U.S. at 598.
449. !d. at 599.
450. The Court, however, in dicta appeared to have a much more concrete approach to determining whether the police officer caused the decendent's injuries. It
questioned whether the lights shining into the decedent's eyes caused him not to stop in
time. /d. at 599. The Court could have similarly decided that no seizure had occurred
if the decedent could have seen the roadblock.
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determined too narrowly. 4111 The issue of foreseeability for a seizure
thus does not require officers to perceive exactly how the means used
will cause the individual to stop; rather, the abstract setting in motion
of these means is sufficient. The Court explained that even if the means
employed stops an "unintended person," 4112 a seizure has occurred. In
contrast, the lower court never discussed the foreseeability of the stop
but instead stressed the decedent's free will to stop. 4118 It stated that the
police officers never "arrested or restrained" his movement. 4114
The final rhetorical device, characterizing the causal connection
between the roadblock and the stop, is similar to the other devices. The
Supreme Court broadly characterized the police officers' behavior in
setting up the roadblock. It found a causal link between the roadblock
and the stop. 41111 The lower court, in contrast, found no link whatsoever.
It linked the stop only to the decedent's decision not to stop, not to the
officers' establishing of a roadblock. 4116
To resolve the issue of .whether an individual has been seized during a pursuit, one should thus emphasize the police officers' conduct
during a pursuit and deemphasize the individual's act of fleeing. This
emphasis is vital because the causation question presented in the third
definition is always subject to two contrasting viewpoints. The Brower
Court expressed an interest in subjecting police officers' conduct to
fourth amendment scrutiny by broadly defining causation.
To broadly view the causation requirement of the third "seizure"
definition would thus be to determine that police officers during a pursuit seized the pursued driver and his passengers who crashed when the
driver lost control. To find that these individuals were "seized" does not.
necessarily mean that the challenged conduct violated the fourth
amendment. The other issue central to fourth amendment claims is the
disproportionally of the force effectuating the seizure. 4117 This latter inquiry is the appropriate place to weigh an individual's interest in personal security against the state's interests, which include an interest in
law enforcement.

451. ld. at 598-599. The Court explained:
In determining whether the means that terminate the freedom of movement
is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a
line, or we will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been
stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant only
to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg.
/d.
452. !d. at 596.
453. 817 F.2d at 546.
454. ld.
455. 489 U.S. at 599.
456. 817 F.2d at 546.
457. See supra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
.fourth amendment standard of disproportionality.
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Even if one narrowly interprets the causation requirement of the
third seizure definition and determines that the dicta in Brower is controlling, individuals not seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment are still protected by the fourteenth amendment standard of disproportionality.4118 This standard, like the fourth amendment standard
of disproportionality, requires that police officers use force that is justified by the circumstances. 4119 Whether one asserts a fourth amendment
claim or a fourteenth amendment claii~1, the individual's interest in personal security receives constitutional protection.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Police pursuits violate the fourth and fourteenth amendments
when they represent the use of excessive force. During every police pursuit, police officers use psychological force, force that causes the pursued driver to increase his speed and the danger to the public. Whether
officers use psychological force or direct physical force, such as ramming the pursued driver's vehicle, the constitutionality of their actions
depends upon the circumstances of each pursuit. Force is permissible
only if it is not disproportionate to the need for it. Disproportionality is
measured by balancing the harm presented by the pursuit itself against
the officers' need to apprehend the fleeing driver. The need to apprehend is directly related to the seriousness of the offense prompting the
pursuit, not to the suspicious act of fleeing. 460 An examination of some
current police pursuit policies reveals that police departments have differently assessed the need for pursuits.
In examining fourth amendment excessive force claims, the United
States Supreme Court articulated a standard that is similar to the disproportionality standard for fourteenth amendment pursuit claims. In
Tennessee v. Garner, 461 the Court explained that officers may use
deadly force to apprehend a suspect if he "poses a threat of serious
physical harm, either to the officer or to others." 462 Similarly, in Graham v. Connor,4 68 the Court stated that the degree of nondeadly force
458. See supra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
fourteenth amendment standard of disproportionality.
459. /d.
460. Some law enforcement officials contend that limiting pursuits of minor traffic offenders would prevent them from effectively protecting the public from criminals.
See, e.g., The Police Yearbook, 1990 International Ass'n Chiefs of Police 75 (October
14-19, 1989). They believe that officers should be able to pursue minor traffic offenders
because police officers may serendipitously apprehend a driver who has committed a
serious, yet unknown, offense. /d. This erroneous view ignores the clear commands of
Tennessee v. ·Garner and Graham v. Connor, in which the Supreme Court held that the
use of force must be related to the seriousness of a known crime.
461. 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
462. /d. at II.
463. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
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permissible depends upon "the severity of the crime at issue, [and]
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.""6" By focusing on the danger that a suspect presents ·
to others, the Court broadly protected a suspect's right to personal security and limited the degree of force officers may use to apprehend a
suspect.
Most pursuit policies recognize that pursuits are inherently dangerous."611 Some policies explicity declare that a pursuit represents the
use of deadly force." 66 Because they directly link deadly force with a
pursuit, they authorize pursuits only when officers would be just\fied in
using deadly force to stop the driver." 67 Similarly, some policies question whether the driver has allegedly committed a "hazardous" offense
or a "violent" offense.' 68 These policies properly recognize that the lawfulness of a pursuit is not related to whether an individual has committed a felony or misdemea:nor." 69 The focus is on the offense the suspect
464. /d. at 1872.
465. See, e.g., Clark County, Ga., Pursuit Policy, Bl.22 (Nov. 1, 1986) ("vehicle
pursuit is justified only when the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the
level of danger created by the pursuit"); Little Rock, Ark., Pursuit Policy, G.O. 17
(Nov. 9, 1989) (pursuits are to be terminated "when the danger created by the pursuit
outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension"); City of Oakdale, Minn., Pursuit
Policy, AD-009 (Dec. 15, 1989) (officers are to question whether "the dangers created
by the pursuit incident exceed the danger posed by allowing the perpetrator to escape"
and whether "a reasonable person [would] understand why the pursuit occurred or was
necessary"); Ohio, Pursuit Policy § 12.045-1 (Apr.l2, 1990) (pursuit justified "only
when the necessity of apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the
pursuit").
466. See, e.g., Volusia County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 41.2 (Feb. 15, 1990) (pursuits are prohibited "unless it is for the apprehension of a supsect under the circumstances which would, at the time the decision is made to pursue, justify the use of
deadly force") (emphasis in original); County of Charleston, S.C., Pursuit Policy, G.O.
81-923(a) (Mar. 23, 1982) ("same judgement must apply to both [pursuits and the use
of firearms]").
467. See, e.g., Volusia County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 41.2 (Feb. 15, 1990). This
pursuit policy complies with the fourth amendment standard for using force. See supra
notes 214-293 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourth amendment standard. This policy limits pursuits to two circumstances:
1. The apprehension of a person reasonably suspected of committing a felony and the deputy reasonably believes that the fleeing person poses a threat
of death or serious injury to others beyond the circumstances directly involved in the pursuit; OR
2. The deputy believes the fleeing person has committed a crime involving
the infliction of serious physical harm or death to another person.
Volusia County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 41.2 (Feb. 15, 1990).
468. See, e.g., Palm Beach County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 87-5 (Jan. 1, 1977)
(pursuit may be initiated only when the driver has allegedly committed a "violent or
hazardous" crime or violation); Metropolitan Police, Boston, Mass., 4.4.1 (July, 16,
1990) ("justification for the initiation or continuation of a pursuit shall be judged on
the basis of the hazard it poses to the safety of the public").
469. See, e.g., Metropolitan Police, Boston, Mass., 4.4.1 (July, 16, 1990) (hazard
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first committed and its dangerousness.
Some policies, however, fail to explain which offenses justify the
danger of a pursuit. 470 Many policies simply state that police officers
should consider the "nature of the offense" committed by a suspect as a
factor in determining whether to pursue. 471 One policy leaves the decision to the "sound judgment" of the officer. 472 Other policies authorize
officers to pursue individuals who violate traffic laws, without cautioning that the traffic offense must have represented a danger to others:m
In addition to these general policies, some policies explicity declare that
a policy of limited pursuit is not in the public's best interest. 474 These
policies declare that officers may pursue a car thief, an individual who
has committed a property offense, even if a pursuit is inherently
dangerous. 4711
Even when policies create a distinction between dangerous and
nondangerous offenses, they sometimes disagree as to which offenses
signify danger. Some policies classify the offense of intoxicated driving
as an offense justifying a pursuit. 476 One state model policy, however,
explicitly forbids pursujt under these circumstances. 477 Although an in-

of a particular offense justifies a pursuit, not whether it is a misdemeanor or felony).
470. See, e.g., Vernon, Conn., Pursuit Policy, Dl (Dec. 1987) (officer is to
"weigh the seriousness of the offense committed against the danger to himself and
others who may be affected by the pursuit"); Cape Coral, Fla., Pursuit Policy, C-2
(Aug. 11, 1989) (officer is to consider the "seriousness of the crime"); City of Overland, Kan., Pursuit Policy, 100-13 (Apr. 13, 1989) ("Pursuits for person(s) suspected
of involvement in serious crime are viewed as more justifiable than those for persons
suspected of only traffic or other misdemeanor violations."); City of Jackson, Tenn.,
Pursuit Policy, 26-89 (Mar. 22, 1989) (officer must consider the "seriousness of the
crime").
471. City of New York, N.Y., Pursuit Policy, 85-11 (Nov. 15, 1985) (officer is to
consider the "nature of the offense"); Broward County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, G.O. 9050 (Aug. 20, 1990) (same).
472. See, e.g., Richmond County, Ga., Pursuit Policy, 87-4.8.
473. See, e.g., Macon, Ga., Pursuit Policy, 4.45 (Jan. 1, 1988) (officer may pursue when the "violator has committed or is attempting to commit a serious felony, or
when the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by
the hot pursuit").
474. See, e.g., West Palm Beach, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 1-9 (Apr. 7, 1989) ("it is
not in the best interests of public safety to advocate a policy that would encourage the
dangerous driver, car thief, or fleeing criminal to proceed without the imminent possibility of police intervention"); Clarksville, Tenn., Pursuit Policy, 10-003(b) (same).
475. See supra note 474.
476. See, e.g., Boynton Beach, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 517.001 (May 11, 1990)
(driving under the influence is a "serious traffic violation" justifying a pursuit); Montana Highway Patrol, Mont., Pursuit Policy, S-41.2.8 (Mar. 1990) (same; reckless
driving also justifies pursuit); United States Capitol Police, D.C., Pursuit Policy, III-1
(October 1, 1989) (intoxicated driving justifies pursuit).
477. Florida Police Chiefs Ass'n, Model Pursuit Policy (1989-90) (offenses of
"burglary, reckless driving, D.U.I., leaving the scene of an accident with injuries ...
are considered less serious and should only be conducted when such a pursuit is in the
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toxicated driver does represent a danger to the public, focus on the
police officers' role during a pursuit indicates that pursuit of such a
driver increases the risk of harm presented by the driver.
Whether a police pursuit is constitutional under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments thus depends upon the danger that the pursued
driver represents and the risk of harm associated with the pursuits. One
should evaluate the danger that a pursued driver represents, however,
before, not after, a pursuit begins because a pursuit itself constitutes
the use of force, force that is to be proportionate to the need for it.
Such force is permissible only if the offense or offenses allegedly committed by the suspect are dangerous offenses.
The typical police pursuit, however, has occurred because an individual allegedly committed a traffic offense. Even though some traffic
offenses may signify serious offenses, pursuits are inherently dangerous.
The lawfulness of the force represented by a pursuit, however, is to be
evaluated in terms of the disproportionality standards of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. These standards have permitted the use of
force when proportionate to the need- a need that not only considers
the personal security interest of the pursued individual but also of
others. Because pursuits themselves may endanger individuals other
than the pursued driver, police officers must also ascertain the need to
apprehend in light of the personal security interests of others.
When one considers the risks associated with pursuits and the offenses that justify those risks, one can discern that most police pursuits
constitute the use of disproportionate force. Pursuing a serial killer may
justify the risks inherent in a high-speed pursuit. Yet, under some circumstances, such as a pursuit in a congested area, one must nevertheless consider whether apprehension of this dangerous person might
cause further death, this time to innocent motorists and pedestrians. To
avoid further loss to liberty and life, police officers need to use other
means to arrest individuals. As the Supreme Court has stated, a police
practice may be unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment if it fails to consider modern technology and the need to protect
the right to personal security.• 78 The practice of pursuing all individuals, regardless of the offense they have allegedly committed, must now
yield, as did the earlier the practice of shooting and killing all fleeing
felons.

best interests of public safety).
478. See, e.g., Garner, 471 U.S. at 13.

